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Road transport has long been, and will be for a long time, the dominant form of
transport for freight and passenger movement  throughout  the world. 2 In Latin America, for
instance, road transport accounts for more than 80% of domestic passenger and over 60%
of  freight movements-over  85% in  some  countries such  as  Brazil.  In  Africa, the
proportions are even higher. Not only is the sector large, but it is still growing rapidly in
many parts of the world. In Asia, from 1984-1994,  the road networks of Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia and Pakistan grew in length by more than five percent per year. In Eastern
Europe, countries historically dominated  by rail are now witnessing a rapid expansion in
the demand for road transport. In Russia, the total freight moved by road is expected to
increase from just over ten percent to almost forty percent within the first decade after the
end of the Soviet Union.
Because most road projects require investments with slow amortization periods and
because many of these projects will not generate sufficient demand to make them self-
financed through some type of user fee or toll, the road sector continues, and will continue
to be, in the hands of the public sector to a much larger extent than the other transport
activities.  3 But fiscal crisis and competing  demands from other sectors such as health and
education are bringing changes in the extent of public-private  partnership in the expansion
and operation of road networks. Governments  throughout the world, including many poor
African and South Asian countries, are commercializing  their operations to  cut costs,
improve user orientation and increase sector  specific revenue. 4
The search for increased private sector participation in  the road  sector applies to
national, high traffic roads (at least 15,000  vehicles per day is a good bet for viable tolling
of roads) as well as to roads falling under the responsibility  of all government  levels. Many
urban roads, often under the responsibilities of sub-national governments, are now also
facing strong increases in demand. From Argentina  to Thailand,  Australia  to Canada, major
arterial roads are being built under toll road concession  schemes. Since in many of these
countries the governments  are increasingly  finding it difficult to finance the costs up front,
they are giving the private sector concessions  to construct  and operate these urban roads for
a specified period of time before inheriting  these assets at the end of the contract,  typically
at a  zero cost. Toll roads (publicly or privately managed) can represent a  very large
'F or additional  information  and  more  data,  see  the  World  Bank  web  site  on  toll  roads  at
www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/tranport/roads/toll_rds.htm.  We  are  also  endebted  to  Nils  Bruzelius,  Jos4
Carbajo, Jose A. G6mez-1banez,  Andres  G6mez-Lobo,  Jose L. Guasch, Jose L. Irigoyen, Alfred Nickesen,
Vincent Piron and Emile Quinet for  useful discussions  and comments  on earlier versions of the paper.
2 See Ian Heggie and Piers Vickers,  Commercial  Management  and Financing  of Roads, (Washington:  World
Bank, 1998),  chapter 2, for more details on the overall  role of the sector.
3 In addition, pricing decisions  in this sector  tend to be influenced  in many countries  by strong trucking
lobbies that aim to keep cost recovery as slow as possible.
4These  partnerships  are not only aimed at convincing  the private sector  to finance its investment  needs  but
also to participate  in reforms  to cut costs in its operation  and maintenance  but this chapter focused on toll
roads. For a more detailed  discussion  of the commercialization  of the sector and of other forms of public-
private partnerships  in the sector, see Heggie and Vickers (1998) and Ecole Nationale  des Ponts et Chaussees
(1998), "Road Financing-  Construction,  maintenance  and operation  ",  Presses  Ponts et Chaussees
2proportion of the high traffic highway systems (up to 80-100%  in some countries)  but they
generally represent a very small share (5-10%) of the total paved road network (but up to
over 30% in some countries such as Argentina,  France and South Korea).
To be effective, toll road projects must meet many requirements to ensure that the
implementation and monitoring of these concessions  by a regulator is smooth. This paper
focuses on the lessons of the international experience with toll road privatization and
regulation. It is oriented toward project finance because the contract can achieve much
more for "road regulators" than for other sectors. This means that an effective design of the
contract at the project time is crucial since often there is little more for a regulator of a road
concession to  do than monitor that all involved parties comply with their contractual
commitments. Furthermore,  in many ways, the renegotiation  of a contract is often a replay
of the initial negotiation with a different distribution  of infornation between the regulator
and the concessionaire.  Full grasp of the basics of contract  design in project finance is quite
important for the regulators.
While there seems to be a demand for toll roads in specific settings,  the problems met
by many of this "first generation"  of road concessions  from Mexico to Thailand have given
toll projects a poor reputation. Many mistakes were made; what is obvious that tolling is
not the best solution for every road. There are many ways to design a project to get the
private sector involved without having to toll the road (see Box  1.1). Most of these
alternatives aim at improving  efficiency (i.e. lowering  costs). But there are also many ways
of getting the private sector involved in toll roads and thus reducing public sector financing
requirements for the sector. Understanding the context in which toll roads are viable is
necessary  both for their initial success  and for effective  long run regulation.
This paper provides a broad overview  of the issues at stake from the view point of a
privatization  team but also from the perspective of a regulator responsible to supervise the
commitments made by the government and the operation to each other and to the users
through the contracts.
2. TOLL ROAD  SERVICES5
2.1.  THE BROAD RELEVANT  ECONOMIC  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE ACTIVITY
When considering an increased role for private activity in the road sector, the most
immediate challenge to confront is the enormous range in the development, quality and
performance of the sector in any given country. These varied settings create different
operating and investment requirements and  hence potentially very  different types  of
possible packaging to make roads attractive  to private investors. The most relevant stylized
economic facts surrounding the decision to toll roads packages is summarized in this
section.
5 Part of this discussion  draws on J.A. Gomez-Ibanez,  "Pricing",  in J.A. Gomez-Ibanez,  W.B. Tye, and C.
Winston,  editors, Essays in Transportation  Economics  and Policy,  (Washington: Brookings,  1999), pp.  119-
127.
3Box 1.1: Contracting  out planning  and management  of roads
Road  agencies  are increasingly  contracting  out:
* planning  and  management  of  selected  roads  to consultants  and  contractors;
* entire road networks, and
* donor-financed  small  infrastructure  projects.
The  first model  is being  used  in the UK,  Argentina,  Australia  and  New  Zealand.  In  the UK,  the process  started
in 1986  when the UK Department  of Transport  decided  to package  parts  of the motorway  network  into
commissions  and  then  invited  bids  from  consultants  to take  on the responsibility  for maintaining  all roads  and
related  structures  within  the commission  to a prescribed  standard.  The  winning  consultant  then organizes  a
competitive  Term  Contract  between  the owner  (Department  of Transport)  and  the contractor  who  then  carries
out all work  on instruction  from  the consultant.  In one of the largest  commissions  (West  Yorkshire,  with 330
lane-km,  305 bridges,  420 km of drains,  950 road  signs  and  3,400  lighting  columns)  costs  fell by well over
15%,  29 of the 34 DOT staff who  were made  redundant  were taken  on by the consultant  (one moved  to
another  job  and  4 took  early  retirement),  and  quality  and  flexibility  of the  maintenance  regime  increased.
The second  model involves  contracting  out the management  function  for the whole network under  the
jurisdiction  of a selected  road agency.  In industrialized  countries  this is generally  being  done  to increase
efficiency  and  as part  of the redefinition  of the role  of government.  In developing  countries,  it is mainly  being
done  to ensure  that a competent  body  that remains  answerable  to the local  distrct council  manages  small
urban  and district  roads.  This model  is being  used in some  small  municipalities  in the US at the County
Council,  at the District  level  in UK (where  it is called  extemalization),  and is also  being  used  for both  urban
and rural district  councils  in Zambia.  These  arrangements  offer great potential  for dealing  with small  road
networks.
The  third  model  is being  used  extensively  in francophone  Africa.  The  AGETIP  is a contract  executing  agency
(like  a private  sector  project  implementation  unit),  set up to execute  donor-financed  infrastructure  projects.
The agency  generally  has a board  composed  of well-known  figures  (which  does not include  govemment
representatives),  a general  manager  appointed  by  the board,  other  line  managers  (administrative  & financial
manager  and  technical  manager),  and  staff hired  under  private  sector  terms  & conditions  of service  who  are
paid competitive  salaries.  The  agency  is set  up as a private,  non-profit  association  and pays no taxes.  The
agency  works on behalf of local authorities  that delegate  certain functions  to the agency. The local
government  usually  reserves  the right  to select  the projects  and the agency  then:  (i) recruits  consultants  to
carry  out detailed  engineering;  (ii) invites  bids  and awards  contracts  for supervision  and  works,  manages  the
contracts,  and pays  the contractors  directly  from  a special  account  opened  in its own  name.  The agency  is
subject  to bi-monthly  management  and  financial  audits  and  an annual  technical  audit.
Source:  Heggie,  I.G.  and  Vickers  (1998),  Commercial  Management  and  Financing  of Roads,  World  Bank
Technical  Paper  No.  409
2.1.1  THE OVERALL  SUPPLY  OF GOOD  ROAD  SERVICES  IS STILL  LIMITED..
The overall market potential is good because the unsatisfied demand for good road
services  is great. Moreover, the need for improvements  in networks is, in many countries, at
least just  as  great. Indeed, many of the new public-private partnerships are  for road
upgrading and paving rather than for greenfield projects. Even if 100% paving of existing
roads is unlikely to be a realistic target for many countries, the margin for improvements
suggest a reasonably good market for private road operators and interested construction
companies. Indeed, in developing countries,  the proportion  of the main road network that is
paved averages to a modest 45.5% (it varies from a low of around 2.5% to a high of 100%).
Furthermnore,  road maintenance  can also easily be improved by their private operators.
In Latin America for instance, over the last fifteen years or so, most governments have
spent roughly one-fourth of what they should have spent to maintain roads. On the other
hand,  this  is  why  it  is  not  uncommon for  new  private  operators to  find  out  that
rehabilitation costs are higher than expected  when they take over the responsibility from the
4government.  This often a subject of dispute  between regulators and private concessionaires
once private operation has been in place for a while. Overall, from a strategic viewpoint,
contracting  out road improvements  can provide a smooth phase-in or learning process into
the development  of a future relationship  with potential private investors into new roads.
2.1.2 THE DEMAND FOR HIGH TRAFFIC ROADS IS STILL GROWING
The demand for road services will continue to grow and hence so will the need for
investment. Worldwide,  the stock of motor vehicles is growing at nearly three percent per
year. Since the number of vehicle kilometers  traveled tends to grow somewhat faster than
the stock of motor vehicles, this implies that at least for some segments of the road
network, the demand prospects are quite good. The fast urbanization of the developing
world adds another dimension that cannot be ignored and explains the strong demand for
urban access roads in many of the most populated countries of the world. The challenge
here is to bet on the right horses. Demand will increase but only on some segments of the
network and it is tempting for a government  to oversell a specific road based on aggregate
traffic growth prospects.
Even holding the effects of toll levels constant, traffic volumes are very sensitive to
income and economic  growth. The failure to recognize  this may be one of the main reasons
why so many toll road projects have failed or ended in bitter renegotiations.  Motorization
and  vehicle-kilometers traveled tend to  increase faster than income levels. This high
income elasticity, especially for leisure trips, makes toll  roads especially sensitive to
macroeconomic conditions. For roads that serve export activities, exchange rate changes
can dramatically  affect trade, leading to major changes  in demand  patterns.
Many toll road projects in the last decade have dramatically overestimated traffic
levels. In some of the Mexican  road concessions,  traffic volumes were only one-fifth of the
forecasted levels. In Hungary,  the Ml Motorway  attracted only fifty percent of its expected
volume in its first year of operation. The Dulles Greenway, outside of Washington, only
attracted one-third of its expected  daily volume.  Even after a toll reduction of forty percent,
the Greenway still was only able to achieve  two-thirds of its originally forecast  volume. 6
2.1.3. THE DEMAND FOR SAFETYIS  GROWIIVG  AS WELL
Investment needs and types will have also to address the need for improved safety.
Each year, over 700,000  people are killed and over ten million are injured in road accidents,
costing the global economy about $500 billion. About seventy percent of these accidents
take place in developing and transition countries. In developing and transition countries,
road accident rates per  10,000 vehicles tend to be twenty to thirty times higher than in
industrialized countries and cost up to two percent of GDP. This is a major concern for
policymakers and  is  becoming a  concern for  private roads operators as  well, since
policymakers  tend to include requirements  in concession  contracts that address the need to
drastically increase highway safety. A peculiar problem arises when governments change
6 The Dulles Greenway  experience  suggests  a toll price elasticity  of -2.3, a very high sensitivity.  This result is
due in part to the upgrading  of a parallel alternative  route. Other  estimates range from -1.4 to -2.5, quite
income elastic in all cases.
5safety regulation in the course of a contract, thereby implicitly changing the investment
requirements  and hence the terms of the agreement  with the private operators.
2.1.4  THE DEMAND  FOR  A NETWORK  OFTEN  DOMINA  TES THE  DEMAND  FOR  A SPECIFIC  ROAD
The demand for a toll and hence the risk attached to a road often depend on the fact
that the toll roads have to be build into integrated networks. It is often forgotten that the
tolled part of a road network benefits tremendously from the existence of a public road
network around it. In fact, the value of a specific road depends a lot on the extent to which
it benefits from a complement of public and private roads. More specifically, the network
characteristics  of the sector means that benefits from investment  at one point in the system
can depend on service flows and capacities at other points. This implies that a number of
service obligations that need to be taken account  by both public and private roads operators.
2.1.5  THE MARKET  FOR TOLL  ROADS  IS VERY  SENSITIVE  TO THE  GLOBAL  FINANCIAL  CONDITIONS
The financial crises that affected  many emerging  markets in 1996-1999  had a dramatic
affect on the evaluation of toll road projects. Project sponsors and creditors experienced
difficulties due to macroeconomic  factors, and financing became much more costly and of
shorter term, thereby adding refinancing  risks. Many toll road projects that were required to
generate returns of fifteen percent in the early 1990s have been re-evaluated in light of
project experiences  to date and because of macroeconomic  uncertainty. The result is that
required returns for toll road projects appear to have risen to twenty percent or more. The
key factors are cost, average daily traffic volumes and the willingness  to pay tolls. Overall,
average daily traffic volumes in excess of 10,000 vehicles per day seem to be required to
attract private capital. Below this traffic volume, various types of government support, such
as grants or guarantees, are likely to be required. The effect is to make many proposed
concessions non-viable, or at least to cause their deferral until greater corridor demand is
assured and a more stable financing environment  exists.
However, a  project's ability to  obtain financing is  not  solely determined by  its
underlying cost and demand. The country and concession environment and the nature of
public-private risk management also have important effects on the viability of toll road
programs. A stable economic and political context has been essential for a sustained toll
road  program.  Since toll  roads  typically are  high  performance highways, they  are
particularly dependent on income levels and economic activity. Moreover, since toll roads
also tend to  be politically visible, they may be subject to attempts to influence project
selection, implementation and  operation, especially through  attempts to  delay  tariff
increases and to evade toll collection entirely.
2.2. THE SPECIFIC  ECONOMIC  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE  ACTIVITY
National characteristics  are important  in developing a greater private role for the road
sector. At the same time, the economic characteristics  of each toll road package must be
clearly understood to design an appropriate public-private partnership. These economic
characteristics  are determined by a number of factors, including the project's function, its
physical characteristics  and the underlying  market demand.
62.2. 1. THE PURPOSE  OFA TOLL  ROAD
The economic characteristics  of the project should be the starting point for designing
the appropriate  role for the private sector, Why is the toll road being put in place is the first
to  question to  ask. In many instances, tolling is  being considered for  fiscal reasons.
Governments  often want new, stable sources of finance and regulators must be quite aware
that this can influence tremendously the choice of a toll road design and pricing form as
discussed later. Toll roads can be classified as congestion relievers, inter-city arterials,
development roads,  or  bridges  and tunnels. Their  main  characteristics are  typically
categorized as follows:
*  Congestion relievers are relatively short roads that are built to relieve traffic on
existing urban routes. SR-91, for example, expands capacity of a major highway in
southern California in the United States. 7 Congestion relievers, while expensive to
build due to land costs, generally  have significant  revenue potential because they tend
to  serve heavy traffic demand. However, the high land acquisition and construction
costs may require high tolls if privately financed, so pricing decisions and regulatory
oversight become very important.  Also, since congestion  may be concentrated at peak
periods, time-of-day and other variable pricing schemes may be required. Tolling is
becoming more widely used as a mechanism  to manage traffic demand on increasingly
congested highways, a change  made easier by advances  in tolling technology that have
made tolling more efficient  and more convenient.
o  Inter-city  arterial roads are built to improve  access between major cities, to airports
or to port/terminal  complexes.  An example  is the Malaysian  North-South Expressway,
linking the Thai border through Kuala Lumpur with Singapore.  These roads tend to be
expensive since they are generally long, high-capacity,  and built to serve heavy truck
traffic.  Tolling decisions between different types  of  user  groups are  particularly
important  for these roads.
*  Development roads link more remote areas with urban  centers or  with  major
transport routes. An example is the Chilean South Access project that links a forestry
region to the port of Concepcion and the Pan-American  Highway. While development
roads can provide a stimulus to economic growth, traffic volumes generally are not
financially sufficient in the early years, and thus are seen as speculative investments
that require substantial public  participation.
*  Bridges and tunnels are typically very short, very expensive  to build per kilometer
relative to roads, and (in most cases) serve high volumes of traffic. They are often built
as congestion relievers and may have a similar strong financial capability due to traffic
volumes. Examples include the Rio-Niteroi Bridge in Brazil and the Dartford Bridge
outside of London.
'7. Capacity can be expressed in terms of the variable passenger car unit (pcu). A pcu is a measure equivalent
to the space occupied by a car, so a coach that occupies  approximately  twice the space of a car corresponds  to
2 pcus and a truck to 2.5 pcus.
72.2.2. THE COSTS  OFA  TOLL ROAD.
Once the purpose of the toll road is clearly  recognized, its costs must be identified. A
project's physical characteristics  are the primary determinants  of its costs. Important aspects
include whether  the project is a new facility or an expansion  of an existing road, the length,
capacity  and design, geographic and geologic aspects,  and toll collection mechanisms.  New
facilities are more costly per kilometer than expansions or  rehabilitations of existing
facilities. Rehabilitation and expansion typically require less construction work than new
facilities.
Moreover, expansion  projects that involve pre-existing  tolled facilities may be able to
use the toll revenues to lower external financing requirements. For example, the Buga-
Tulua expansion project in Colombia, which connects three major cities, was able to use
existing tolls for about one-third of project costs. Wider roads (number of lanes), their
thickness and construction technique, and the type of geography traversed also are key
determinants of project costs. As a result, project costs can vary over a wide range. The
South  Access  project  in  Chile,  which  featured  favorable  geography  and  mostly
rehabilitation work,  cost  about  US$0.2  million  per  kilometer.  By  comparison the
Guangzhou-Shenzen highway, which involved six  lanes through  a  region subject to
flooding, cost over US$15 million per kilometer. Bridges and tunnels, because of design
requirements,  tend to be much more expensive; the Dartford Bridge cost US$247 million
for 2.8  kilometers, or  US$88 million per  kilometer. 8  The proposed Colonia Bridge
connecting Argentina and Uruguay was forecast to cost in excess of US$22 million per
kilometer (over US$800 million  total cost).
Finally,  it  is  important to  recognize that road  capacity presents  high  levels  of
"indivisibility". For example,  each lane in a highway typically represents a maximum offer
of two thousand vehicles per hour, but it also represents the minimum offer per lane. If
demand is about three thousand vehicles per hour, capacity will end up being four thousand
vehicles per hour and the market will have excess capacity. So while a bus or a train
company can adapt the number of vehicles to fluctuations  in demand, in road service, full
capacity is offered at all times. Therefore, if capacity is designed for peak periods, during
off-peak periods, the road will be underused. This means that if investment in capacity in
road infrastructure  is carried out for long periods, schemes must be introduced across the
board in the toll design to recover investment cost while preventing motorists from being
overcharged.
2.2.3 THE DEMAND FOR A SPECIFIC TOLL ROAD
The next crucial component of the economic picture of a toll road is determined by
demand considerations. Market demand can be measured in terms of actual or expected
traffic levels, predictability of expected traffic, and the willingness to pay tolls. Each of
these measures is critical to the design of toll road projects because they determine  whether
there is a revenue stream large enough and predictable enough to obtain financing. The
Mercer (1996),
8markets served, the number and quality of competitive  alternative  routes, and the toll road's
links to the rest of the transport  network also affect traffic levels. Predicting traffic levels is
especially difficult for two reasons. New projects are unable to  rely on existing traffic
volumes as the basis for demand forecasts.  As a result, they must turn to other methods of
demand estimation, such as  stated preference models, which  may  be  less  reliable. 9
Judgments must  be made  about the new road's ability to  draw traffic  from  existing
alternatives and to generate new traffic. The second reason is that in cases where projects
are to  be  stand-alone, the level of tolls required to  cover costs and provide required
financial returns may be far above existing toll levels, if tolls are levied at all. In these
cases, estimates of price sensitivity and willingness  to pay for new facilities become very
hard.
2.2.4 THE WILLINGNESS VS. THE ABILITY TO PA  YFOR A ROAD
It is often forgotten that road investments must take into account the need to serve
different user groups, including very poor users in rural areas that may not be able to afford
the toll levels that are required to allow the operators  to recover their investments. This is
quite important since road investments  are "irrecoverable"  or "sunk" in the sense that, once
built, they cannot be converted to other uses or moved elsewhere.'  0 While investors must be
guaranteed the fair opportunity to recover their investments, the ability to pay  for all
segments of the concerned population must be considered at the time the privatization is
being prepared, in order to avoid future tensions between users and operators. This is why
the  political  challenge  of  introducing  tolls  is  quite  different  for  greenfield  and
rehabilitation/upgrading  projects. For a given contract duration, tolls for new roads will
often be much higher than for rehabilitation  projects because amortization costs tend to be
much higher for greenfield  projects.
More generally, the experience of Latin America and Eastern Europe shows that the
standard assumptions that toll road users are willing to pay high tolls to compensate for
reductions in travel time and vehicle operating costs are not as realistic as many academics
would like them to be. This is a major problem since the tolls that users in these regions are
willing to pay for may not be sufficiently high to attract private equity (or debt for that
matter). Some practitioners are arguing that the standard traffic models used to forecast the
demand for the roads are too mechanical  and do not recognize well enough the behavioral
changes that toll brings about. For instance, Piron reveals that for a  series of toll road
projects in France, a number of critical factors had been omitted from the traffic forecast
models. These included the importance of the use of the toll for the overall budget of the
private or commercial users of the facilities and the change in the willingness to pay with
the distance to be covered by the user. II
9 For a review of demand estimation  methodologies,  see K. Small and C. Winston, "The  Demand for
Transportation:  Models and Applications,"  in J.A. Gomez-Ibanez,  W.B. Tye, and C. Winston, editors, Essays
in Transportation  Economics  and Policy, (Washington:  Brookings, 1999),  pp. 11-56.
1°  The fact that road investment  is sunk, rather than subject to economies  of scale, is an important distinction.
Highway operating  costs (with the possible  exception  of costs imposed  by heavy axle loadings) tend not to be
very sensitive  to volume.
'"  Piron, V. (1999), "Urbain-Interurbain:  La Problematique  est devenue globale", Transport, No 393, Jan.
Feb.
93. PRIVATIZATION  AND  REGULATORY  TRENDS
3.1. THE MOVEMENT  TOWARD  PRIVATELY  FINANCED  TOLL  ROADS
The trend toward increased tolling of roads is clear. The precursors were in the United
States and Europe. In the first half of the nineteenth  century,  private toll roads outnumbered
public roads in the United States.  But during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century,
the growth of the railways and problems with toll evasion led to a decline in private toll
roads. Toll road development in the United States further slowed after 1956, when the
Federal Highway Act established a federal gasoline tax to fund the interstate highway
system and prohibited tolling on new, publicly financed highways. By the late  1980s,
though, public funding constraints and infrastructure  demands stimulated new interest in
toll roads, mostly as congestion  relievers in metropolitan  areas.
European countries have had more experience with toll roads in recent decades, but
with mixed results. Toll financing developed in Europe after World War II due to rapid
growth and budget constraints. In France, public toll financing was used in the 1950s and
early 1960s, while private toll concessions were introduced in the late 1960s and early
1970s. Only one in four of the French concessionaires  have survived, however. In Spain,
private toll financing for inter-city motorways was introduced in the 1960s; nine of the
twelve original concessions  continue to have a major role in Spain's road network. In Italy,
more  than twenty concessionaires  have built over 5,000  kilometers of toll roads. The largest
of the Italian concessionaires, Autostrade, operates most of the highway network. Toll
systems also are in widespread  use in Austria, Denmark,  Greece, Norway and Portugal. The
Norwegian system is quite unusual in that concession companies are used to collect tolls,
while the government  road administration  retains responsibility  for design, construction  and
maintenance.
The  latest  wave  of  toll  roads  is  in  developing countries, where  economic and
population growth and growing links with intemational  markets led to pressures for more
highways. Mexico launched perhaps the most ambitious program of new roads, to build
more than 5,000 kilometers of new roads between 1989 and 1994, the majority of which
have  not  met  projections and  have  had  to  be  restructured with  significant public
contributions. Expansion of existing toll road systems has met better, although still mixed,
success in  other Latin American countries, most notably Chile, Argentina and Brazil.
Private or public-private toll concessions also have been pursued in China, Colombia,
Ecuador, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Peru, the Philippines and
Thailand. Many of these projects are discussed in the context of particular issues in the
sections that follow.
In terms of numbers, Public Works  Financing, one of the publications  monitoring the
development of infrastructure  projects, has identified 121 projects in developed counties
between January 1985 and October 1998.12  The average project value was around $750
million (driven by a number of EEC-sponsored  mega-projects in Europe). A World Bank
database for developing countries identified 280 roads projects in partnership with the
12 Public  Works Financing (1998),  "International  Major Projects  Survey", PWF Intemational
10private sector between  1990 and  1997. The average project size was  around US$190
million but with a very large dispersion across regions. Eastern European projects have
reached enormous proportions while South Asian projects have tended to be the smallest
one. As seen in Table 1.1, the bulk of these projects were in East Asia and Latin America.
Table 1.1: Divestitures, concessions  and O& M contracts
in developing and transition economies  (1990-1997)
l fue  . 8$  426  18,567  1086  18,794.8  63.5  38,937.3
85.2  182  543  202  10.6  187
Source  World  Bank  PPI  database
Table 1.2 summarizes the scope of toll road provision in selected countries. While toll
roads are typically only a small share of the total road network, they tend to be located in
the most densely traveled corridors and thus have the potential to play major roles in the
transport network.  Toll  roads  in  many  countries comprise  a  dominant  share  of  the
expressway network and thus may play particularly important roles in urban areas and in
inter-city trade.
00300.00.0  g11  1,980,000  |  n/a  |  856  0.04%  n/a  l
966,000  14,886  6,305  0.65%  42%
flwi  'ary  i  158,600  435  57  0.04%  13%
Indonesia  .07g  260,000  530  530  0.20%  100%
Ita'  :ly  7000iQ7001  314,360  6,444  5,550  1.77%  86%0  l
JapWn  '7i00  50  1,144,360  15,079  9,219  0.81  %  |  61  %
rea,  :;  Re  77,000  1,880  1,880  2.44%  100%
.alasia  |  94,000  1,702  1,127  1.20%  66%
'*xi.~co  A0A.  303,262  5,683  5,683  1.87%  100%
South Africa  525,000  1,440  825  0.16%  57%
Sp  .in  -. 000.  343,200  7,194  2,255  0.66%  31%
Sources:
1. 1,  Heggie and P. Vickers, Commercial Management and Financing of Roads (updated for Indonesia from
Dr. Bambang Bintoro Soedjito, Bappenas, Speech to Seminar in Tokyo, 1999 and Malaysia, Spain and
Japan, PadeCo Co. Ltd. (4) report)
2: PadeCo Co. Ltd., Asian Toll Road Development Program: Review of Recent Toll Road Experience in
Selected Countries and Preliminary Tool Kit for Toll Road Development, 1999
113.2 EXPERIENCES  IN  PRIVATIZATION1 3
Many  toll  road  projects have  been  undertaken, each  with  different  design  and
investment demands and political and organizational arrangements.  Many toll roads have
been negotiated quite loosely and have often been the outcome of informal agreements
between the government and a construction company. Other programs have been overly
ambitious and have resulted in partial or total failures because they were implemented too
quickly. Sound toll roads require good planning. The government should consider funding
preliminary studies that demonstrate public commitment, increase the future regulator's
knowledge base and help reduce the costs of delivering road services. These studies might
involve such matters as studies of environmental  and land acquisition needs and indicative
traffic and revenue projections (which are essential preparation  for both contract design and
renegotiation )and project design criteria. Design specifications  can range from virtually no
public sector responsibility for road features to detailed specifications  with respect to route,
alignment, capacity, locations of interchanges, materials, pavement, etc. A lower level of
public involvement allows the private sector to provide potentially innovative solutions and
better match infrastructure  provision to market demand. However, allowing this flexibility
reduces the  ability to  compare proposals, since different  bidders may  take  different
approaches  to project design. Projects that have limited opportunities for innovation should
be more explicit in design and award criteria.
Experience suggests that three key project selection and  design issues should be
addressed early in the concession process: whether a parallel free road should be required;
the feasibility of cross-subsidies; and whether concessions should be for a single road in a
network or for a "package"  of roads.
3.2.  1  PARALLEL  FREE ROADS
While the idea of having competition between roads is a good one in principle, the
evidence so far suggests that traffic levels in most developing countries cannot sustain
duplication from free alternative routes. Toll road traffic in such cases has generally fallen
well below projections. The Mexican toll road program illustrates the challenges imposed
by parallel roads. Launched in 1985,  this program introduced a toll road development plan
with a range of conditions, one of which was the provision of a free alternative parallel
route. Traffic predictions for the concessioned roads suggested that trucks would form
about 20-45% of the traffic. In fact they turned out to be only about 5%. A black market in
toll receipts developed by which truckers used the parallel free roads yet produced toll
receipts for their employers in order to reap financial benefits. This problem was overcome
when the road operators agreed to exempt trucking companies  from paying a toll.
This experience suggests that the competition argument is difficult to implement in an
environment where  traffic  is  not  strong enough and  lobbies are  powerful. The best
argument in favor of free parallel roads is one of social equity, to ensure that the poor can
still have access to the road network, but this  often detracts from the new toll road's
effectiveness in alleviating  congestion and may also cause problems for cost recovery if the
toll cannot produce enough revenue.  In general, tariff differentiation,  as discussed later, will
13 This section draws on the World  Bank toll road web site
12be a much better solution  to help the poor, therefore reducing the case for a parallel toll free
road.
3.2.2. USING EXISTING CONCESSION REVENUES TO FUND NEW PROJECTS
In some cases, existing roads have been tolled in order to provide revenue for the
construction of new segments  in the network. The French pioneered this technique whereby
new roads  with higher construction costs are  supported by  operating surpluses from
existing toll roads.'  The Japanese also have been very committed to this concept, having
used tolls to generate revenue for road construction since the mid-1960s.1 5 In 1972 a "toll
revenue pooling system" was introduced.  The pools are separate for urban expressways  and
for regional networks. Tolls are set equally on all routes and segments of the network, no
matter what the construction costs or traffic levels. The Japanese felt that traffic forecasts
could only be achieved  if the full network was in place, and that profitability of some routes
would be  improved by the opening of  connecting routes. Politically, it was easier to
establish common tolls across the network because it avoided confusion and was "fair",
since all roads provide essentially  the "same"  service.  More generally, it is very conmnon  to
'create' profitability to fund a new road or concession. Similar stories can be told about
several Asian toll roads programs.
Vhile these examples illustrate that tolling can assist in releasing funds for new
construction, from a regulator's viewpoint, the standard risks implied by cross subsidies
require close monitoring of the cost structure  of the various roads to ensure that the average
toll is not higher than it needs to be. It is important  to monitor the transfer of resources from
one group of consumers to another because those who are paying tolls on the existing road
are thereby paying for the construction of a new road, which would otherwise have been
funded by taxpayers and will provide benefits for other future users. This may be part of a
government program of regional development  that needs to be explicitly recognized. Toll
roads are often developed in congested corridors of a capital city because good revenue
streams there are easier to predict. Where this is the case, the investment in the road is
benefiting more affluent areas of the country. If this crowds out other investments in less
affluent areas of the country,  then other regional equity issues are raised.
3.2.3  SHOULD  CONCESSIONS BE "PACKAGES" OR INDIVIDUAL PROJECTS?
The project economics  of toll roads suggest that traffic volumes must be in the range of
10,000-15,000 vehicles per  day  in  order for  toll  revenues to  be  sufficient to  cover
construction, operating and financing costs. In many countries, only a few such corridors
exist. For other roads that may serve important  transport roles, it may be possible to bundle
a package of roads into a single concession. The pooling of existing roads reduces the
volatility of overall concession cash flows and may thus increase financial viability. In
14 see F. Papon,  "Comparaison  des  Principes  de Financement  des  routes  dans  Differents  Pays,"  in Le
Financement  de La Route, (Paris: Presses de l'ecole  nationale des ponts et chaussees, 1998),  pp. 481-490.
15  Operating and maintenance  costs and interest costs on the construction  loans took up 57% of the total
pooled toll revenue on the 6,416  km National Expressway  Network in 1997.  Approximately  50% of routes
generated revenue in excess of their operating,  maintenance  and interest costs. Source:  Jun-ichi Matoba,
Director for Toll Road Development,  Ministry of Construction,  Japan, "Toll  Road System in Japan:
Expressway  Network Development  through Public  Corporations",  paper to Tokyo conference 1999.
13some cases, this may involve transfer of an existing toll road or major untolled route that
may need upgrading or expansion, along with an associated feeder network. If properly
designed,  the feeder network could serve to enhance the viability of the main toll road.
3.3. ORGANIZATIONAL  OPTIONS
There are many ways of designing  a road concession.  Table 1.3 presents a spectrum of
alternatives for the involvement  of the private sector in the provision of toll roads, ranging
from maintenance  contracts through full Build-Operate-Transfer  concessions and Corridor
Management. Each  option is  described in  terms of the nature of  public and  private
involvement and  typical  features  (e.g.,  duration  and  project  size).  The  principal
responsibilities for toll road  development include design, maintenance, toll  collection,
financing and legal ownership. In practice however, governments seldom follow a pure
strategy and end up combining various types of contractual arrangements (illustrated by
Argentina's restructuring  experience,  discussed  in Box 1.2).
Box 1.2: Increasing  private participation  in roads:  Argentina's experience
The general privatization  strategy  was to unbundle financially  viable roads into build-operate-transfer  (BOT)
concessions  awarded  through competitive  bidding. Most of the traffic is concentrated  near major city nodes,
such as Buenos Aires and Rosario and C6rdoba to a lesser extent. The national concession program has so
far focused on the multi-lane roads and freeways serving these cities, along with other inter-city and major
city access roads. It applies now to almost 9,500 km of 38,000 km of national roads. The concession
program was  complemented by  an  auction  of  management contracts (generally for  five years)  for
rehabilitation and maintenance, now covering about 12,000  km of national roads divided into 400 sections
and auctioned out into 61 contracts.  Also, non-toll concession contracts cover about 1,900 km of national
roads (six corridors) and allow the government  to rely on a private financing of the initial rehabilitation in
exchange for a commitment  to future disbursements  of monthly subsidies during the ten year terms of the
concessions.  A more recent program called  "km/month" covers basic maintenance  and service contracts for
4,100 km of less traveled roads. Overall, about 70% of the national road network is defacto  under private
operation.
The Build-Operate-Transfer  (BOT) model has been most widely used. This structure
can be broadly defined to include variations such as Build-Own-Operate-Transfer  (BOOT);
Build-Lease-Transfer  (BLT);  Rehabilitate-Operate-Transfer  (ROT);  and  similar
arrangements  that are used to develop new facilities or rehabilitate existing roads. Under
the generic BOT model, a private consortium receives a concession to  finance, build,
control and operate a facility for a limited time, after which the facility is transferred back
to the government. What makes the road sector so special in this context is that in most
countries, the consortium includes a major foreign and/or local construction company
mostly interested in the short term use of its assets (essentially  machinery) and skills. This
often has an influence on the way in which contracts are drafted and also on the speed of
the  investments to  be  made. Governments should pay  close attention to  ensure that
investments are driven by demand rather than by the short term concerns of a consortium
motivated by the opportunity  for construction  profits - as has been the case in too many toll
roads projects.
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Argentina,
Mexico
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*  Payment  *  Fixed  of toll revenue  may pay  investment  contributes
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E  .|Siti~n~ttd  *  Traffic &  revenue levels  *  Some  regulatory  *  Some  *  Macro
tClOC8tiOfl  ri.lts  revenue levels  regulatory  regulatory  *  Some regulatory
. Small  a  Medium  /  *  Small /  . Medium!  *  Very Large  . Medium / Large
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Note: For more details and some differences  see also ADB: Developing  Best Practices for Promoting  Private Sector Investment in Infrastructure:
Roads, 1999  (Forthcoming)
15The consortium typically assumes primary responsibility for constructing the project,
arranging financing, maintaining the road and collecting tolls, while the public sector
retains legal ownership and  regulatory oversight of the  concession contract. In  most
projects, design responsibility is shared, with the public sector taking the lead in corridor
identification and preliminary design, leaving specific details to the private sector, subject
to goverunent approval. In practice, the government often ends up sharing some of the
demand risks through the payment of subsidies. Typical BOT concessions are twenty to
thirty years in length, whereas maintenance  concessions  tend to be shorter, typically five to
fifteen years. They differ in length because of the different financial requirements. The
duration of the concession  may either be set in advance by the government or be part of the
decision criteria in selecting  the concessionaire.
Overall, BOT  concessions are most likely to  be  successful under  the following
conditions:
*  Projects minimizing costs in existing  high traffic corridors, e.g.:
o  Projects with missing links such as river crossings, since they minimize land
costs,
o  Inter-urban  projects with low implementation  costs, and
o  Urban area projects at grade or elevated  since they keep construction  costs low;
- Projects in countries where there is a tradition of paying public tolls, or at least
where the willingness  to pay the proposed  toll level has been carefully assessed;
*  Projects where tolls are set at, or close to, the revenue maximizing tariff and toll
escalation formulas  are invoked;  and
- Projects where there is an existing income stream from which to draw revenues
from day one, perhaps even during the construction  period.
3.4. RISK ALLOCATION  OPTIONS  16
The.  choice among the options for private participation  shown in Table 1.3 depends on
the particular needs of a country and the nature of risk-sharing between the public and
private sectors. Risk allocation is a complex and difficult process, and for all practical
purposes,  it is a negotiated process. Unfortunately,  these initial negotiations seldom involve
the  future regulators, even when their  outcome is  critically important to  regulatory
decisions. This is why one of the first tasks a new regulator has to address in its new
position is to understand  the distribution  of risks to which each party is committed through
the contract, since in many renegotiation or regulatory disputes, the responsibility will be
based on the assignment spelled out in the contract.
The rule of thumb is that private road infrastructure  projects work best when project
risks and responsibilities are assigned to the party that can best bear them. The private
sector generally is better at managing commercial risks and responsibilities, such as those
associated with construction, operation and financing. In contrast, toll roads may also
depend on public participation in areas such as acquisition  of right-of-way, political risk,
16 For  a much  more  detailed  analysis,  see Irwin,  T. et alt.  (1997),"  Dealing  with  Public  Risk  in Private
Infrastructure",  World Bank Latin American and Caribbean  Studies.
16and in some cases, traffic and revenue risk. Successful  projects have been characterized  by
a broad level of risk-sharing  between the public and private sectors. Privately-supported  toll
road projects work best when experienced,  well-capitalized  firms have some discretion over
design and confidence in toll policy to accept construction and some degree of traffic risk,
while the government assumes the risks that it controls and considers giving financial
support or guarantees if traffic levels in the early years are insufficient.
In practice, this theory of risk allocation is often not applied. Part of the reason is that
risk levels and types tend to change. The 1998 Asian crisis sufficiently  increased risk levels
around the world, increasing the cost of capital to unbearable levels for many potential
investors. On the other hand, governments can also be subject to a "fear-greed cycle" in
which governments become afraid of program failure and thus offer increasingly better
terms. On the other hand, prospective concessionaires  may worry that they will be "left out"
and end up making unrealistically  optimistic  bids. Subsequently,  the element of greed takes
over and governments  may fail to live up to commitments  and the private sector seeks ways
to privatize gains and socialize  the project risks.
The main risks facing toll road projects are pre-construction activity, construction,
traffic and revenue, currency, force majeure, tort liability, political risk and financial risk.
These risks must be addressed in a satisfactory  manner before debt and equity investors will
commit to project funding. The standard risk identified in contracts are: pre-construction,
construction, traffic and revenue, financial, regulatory and political. In  addition, force
majeure and legal liability are commonly addressed in contracts since they have proven to
be serious sources of cost overruns in the sector.
3.4.1.  PRE-CONSTRUCTIONRISKS
Many projects have been delayed because of difficulties of acquiring right-of-way or
environmental clearance that  were underestimated by  both  the governments and  the
operators. The most relevant effect is cost overrun during project development.  In general,
the public sector often ends up taking on the responsibility  for most of these risks since it is
often easier for the public sector to take the responsibility for acquiring the right-of-way,
paying for it, and contributing this asset to the project. Problems often arise when the
government is not providing the road itself. If a private sector partner is  undertaking
construction, the delineation of responsibility and phasing of development by the different
parties is particularly important.
Regulators end up having to address this kind of risk. A new segment of the Don
Muang Tollway in Bangkok, Thailand will connect the airport with another toll road. In
1989,  the Don Muang Tollway Public Company  Limited (led by a German firm) received a
25-year concession from the Department  of Highways to build the US$407 million, 15.4
km initial segment of the project. One clause in the concession  agreement specified that the
government would remove flyovers on a parallel road which competes with the toll road
and  would  then  construct  new  flyovers  to  allow  radial  movement. However,  the
government did not  deliver for more than two years. In  addition, it blocked toll rate
increases until the completion of the new flyovers. As a result, toll revenues were almost
30%  lower  than  had  been  forecast for  the period.  The sponsor  ended up  close to
bankruptcy, which forced the government  to provide significant compensation  in exchange
17for a 40% stake in the company,  thereby  helping refinance  the loans. 17 One way of reducing
transaction costs is to come up with a clearer contractual  commitment for the government
to take on that risk and possibly to have the government put a guarantee fund together to
establish the  credibility of  its  commitment, in  the  same way  that  governments ask
concessionaires  to fund commitments  through guarantee  funds. The general principle is the
same: credible, rule-driven  decisions are always easier for the regulator to implement.
3.4.2. CONSTRUCTIOJ  RISKS
A common cause of cost overrun stems from design changes and unforeseen weather
conditions during the construction phase. For instance, between the time that a concession
is signed and when the concessionaire  takes over the business, a hurricane can significantly
increase construction costs. Who should pay for the consequences of the hurricane? The
private sector typically bears primary responsibility  for such risks and may attempt to cover
some of them through insurance.  However, the public sector may assume responsibility for
risks under its control, such as completing complementary  facilities (connecting  roads or
interchanges) or allowing cost increases associated with major design changes. It is also
common for governments to at least cost share in projects that face major construction
uncertainties  (e.g., toll roads through mountains).
In most cases, though, fixed price construction  contracts are used, with some provision
for severe disruptions. For example, in Brazil, a  "financial equilibrium clause" enables
contractors to renegotiate contract terms if major design changes are required. When there
are massive cost overruns, contract renegotiation may be required in exchange for the
provision  of  additional financing  by  sponsors and  creditors. This  occurred in  the
Guangzhou-Shenzen project  in  China, where  an  additional US$700  million  equity
investment was made by the private sponsors in exchange for an increase in the profit
sharing agreement during the first ten years of operation.
It may be worth mentioning that the use of fixed construction prices in the contract is
consistent with the idea of facilitating the work of regulators,  but it also illustrates  the costs
and risks involved with accepting rules too readily. It is not uncommon for concession  units
to be staffed with members of the public roads department.  In some countries, this staff has
an established contact with many of the local construction  companies through procurement
and maintenance  contracts for the public roads, and the bidding rules for these contracts are
not as competitive as they should be, resulting in construction  prices that are not consistent
with best practice. Thus, the risk is that unit prices built into concession contracts are based
on the wrong prices (in the best of cases), or they reflect collusion between the concession
unit and the concessionaires  (in the worst case scenario).  In other words, regulators should
not always take construction unit prices for granted when they have the option to review
them.
3.4.3.  TRAFFIC  AND REVENUE  RISKS
Demand uncertainty continues  to be a major problem at the conception stage and ends
up haunting many, if not most, projects. Traffic and toll levels may not be sufficient to
17 For more details , see ADB, Developing  Best Practices  for Promoting  Private Sector Investment  in
Infrastructure:  Roads, 1999 (Forthcoming).
18cover all costs, including construction,  operation and maintenance.  An approximate rule of
thumb is that 10,000-15,000  vehicles per day (vpd) are needed to fully cover operating and
capital costs. Coverage of operating costs alone generally requires  traffic in excess of 3,500
vpd. Recovery of toll collection costs requires approximately 1,500 vpd.'8 The handling of
traffic and revenue risks ranges from full private sector assumption  to government-provided
traffic and revenue guarantees. The policy issues involved with managing these risks are
major  strategic choices that  are  discussed in  detail  later  in  this  chapter  and  vary
tremendously  depending on the time and location  of the project.
The main concern of a regulator in this context is to make sure that it has access to the
demand studies that were conducted in preparation  for the tolling of the road network. As
explained earlier, forecasting  demand is a challenging task that is often underestimated  by
privatization teams. Over-optimism is  common for privatization teams who  focus on
convincing private operators  of the value of their business and for potential operators who
want to make a deal and are convinced that they can renegotiate almost anything once they
have taken over the business. To be somewhat  credible, much more so than in most other
transport studies, the analysis of the willingness  to pay for a toll road has to be combined
with a study of ability to pay, in order to fairly assess the traffic and revenue risks. In many
toll road renegotiations,  the main concern of the regulator is the need to avoid boycotts of
the road by users who are unwilling or unable to pay for the toll. The solution is often to
cap the  toll and  adjust the duration of the  contract, but the  adjustment often entails
significant  transaction  and political costs that most regulators  wish to avoid.
3.4.4. CURRENCY RISKS
The main currency risk is driven by the impact of fluctuations  in the exchange rate on
the value of the business.  In addition, the toll concession  can be subject to a convertibility
risk that refers to the possibility that the operator  may not be allowed to exchange local for
foreign currency. These are major issues for toll roads that are financed with foreign capital
because revenues are commonly in  local currency and adjustments for  inflation and
exchange rates may lag or encounter political opposition. Projects can reduce this risk by
tapping  domestic capital markets where possible.  Most projects attempt  to  mitigate
exchange risk by including provisions for indexing to inflation, although in practice, the
magnitude of exchange volatility has made such requirements  difficult  to enforce.
In Peru, for instance, this risk is addressed and shared in the following way in the
concession contracts. To begin with, the initial basic toll unit is expressed in dollars. This
tariff is adjusted every six months with the consumer price index, by a devaluation index
published by the National Statistics Office. The devaluation  adjustment  only kicks in when
the devaluation rate is higher than inflation. The toll is adjusted by 50% of the difference
between devaluation  and inflation.  A general formula  would look like this:
PtMN=  Pt-1 MN  * (1  +  CPIt-1)  *  [1 +  f*  (DEV  t-  - CPIt-i)]
if DEV t-l > CPIt 1, and where:
Pt MN :Toll base adjusted in national currency  for the period t
"  Source:  Fayard, Alain.  The East-West European  Road Conference,  Varsovie,  22-24 September, 1993.  Toll
Financing, Risk Financing,  How to fit the needs without  dogmas: The French  experience
19Pt-,  MN :Toll base in national currency  for the previous  period
D  :Factor  by which the difference  between devaluation  and inflation can be passed on
through tolls, which essentially is the variable over which a negotiation takes place
between  the government  and the concessionaire.
CPIltl  :Consumer  Price Index in the period t- I
DEV  t-l :Devaluation  in the previous period
Having an explicit formula like this is always a blessing for regulators and is now
becoming standard in concession contracts so that when an explicit rule is not available,
regulators only have to check compliance rather than arbitrate a negotiation between the
government  and the concessionaire.
3.4.5 FINANCIAL RISKS
Financial risk is the risk that project cash flows might be insufficient to cover debt
service and then pay an adequate  return on sponsor equity. Financing constraints,  especially
the lack of long-term debt capital, significantly hinder toll road development. Since the
advent of financial crises in emerging markets, few projects have been able to generate
returns on investment  that are sufficient  to attract private capital. Required debt ratios have
fallen from 70% to 40%-50%, with costs of capital rising to 20% or more. This suggests
that until macroeconomic  risk premiums decline and traffic growth is more established,
only  the  highest density projects will be  undertaken without substantial government
support. The financial crises will force many programs to slow down and will force debt
restructuring of many existing concessions. There is  a need to  promote more secure
financing structures  to reduce the risk of potential  bailouts.
Because toll roads are long-lived investments with high start-up costs, countries with
local  capital markets that  are  capable of  providing long-term financing have many
advantages in supporting toll road concessions. Of particular importance is the available
maturity of domestic finance. In many countries, new toll concessions have been unable to
obtain financing for longer than five to six years, which creates a major refinancing risk
that  either renders the project nonviable or requires government guarantees of such a
rollover.
In theory, financial risk is best borne by the private sector, but in toll road projects
there is likely to be substantial government risk-sharing, either through revenue or debt
guarantees, or participation by state or multilateral development institutions. There also
may be cash grants or other financial contributions that serve to improve the project's rate
of return on private finance.
3.4.6  REGULATORY  RISKS
Regulatory risk stems from the weak implementation  of regulatory commitments that
are built into the contracts and the laws or other legal instruments that are relevant to the
value of the transaction as it was originally assessed. Essentially, the question is whether
the regulator will exercise its authority and responsibilities  over prices, public obligations,
competition rules and similar rules that are specified in the contracts, and whether that will
influence  the Value  of the business.  This risk is more common  than it appears, and pressures
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rate of return. In 1999, a major factor in the restructuring of Mexico's toll road program
was the pressure on regulators to cut tolls. In Thailand, a similar concern resulted in a
decision by the government  to cut a toll level by 50% of what it had committed to in a BOT
contract. The outcome was that the governnent ended  up taking over the toll.
The solution is to try to make sure that regulators  have rules to follow and that they are
independent  enough to be able to enforce them. First, the rules must cover the possibility of
adapting the contract terms during the tenure of the concessionaire.  Toll roads concessions
tend to be quite long, and the legal environment in reforming countries tends to change
during that period. For instance, environmental  and safety concerns are increasing in many
countries. New laws are introduced during the term of many toll roads. The rules that
allocate the financial consequences  of these changes  between the government, the users and
the operators  are critical, yet often forgotten.
Even if regulatory rules are clear, they are only as effective as the regulator. The best
designed regulatory contract is useless if the regulator is not independent  or fair, which has
been a major source of concern in Brazil. For example, in a concession between Rio and
Teresopolis, illegal access and egress has been estimated at 3,000 vehicles per day. This
"leakage" has been championed  by the mayor of Mage (a small town along the route), who
feels that his citizens should not have to pay what are perceived  to be very high charges for
local access users. Regulators have not been able to enforce the contractual commitments
made to the operator.
3.4.7  POLITICAL  RISK
Political risk concerns government actions that affect the ability to generate earnings.
These could include actions that terminate the concession; the  imposition of taxes or
regulations that severely reduce the value to investors; restrictions on the ability to collect
or raise tolls as specified in the concession agreement; and the preclusion of contract
disputes to be resolved reasonably. Governments  generally agree to compensate  investors
for political risks, although in practice, governments  may cite justifications for their actions
to delay or prevent such payments. Thus, private investors generally assume the risks that
are associated with  dispute resolution and the  ability to  obtain compensation if  the
government should violate the concession agreement. The issue  of  meeting financial
obligations while disputes are resolved  may be achieved by requiring debt service reserves,
escrow, or standby financing.
In Brazil, local political interference has affected several toll road projects. A state-
level concession in Parana is the most significant example to date. In this case, new tolls
were introduced during peak harvest season and the governor forced the concessionaire to
charge only 50% of the original tariff. The case is now nearing a decision in court, but all of
the other concessions are paying close attention.  If the original toll contract structure is not
fully upheld, it will be more difficult to accomplish  refinancing and to attract capital on
favorable terms for a second wave of concessions. Investment bankers cautioned that if
these court issues regarding toll revisions in Parana are not resolved, an additional 200
basis points  could be  required for those projects in  regions with particularly populist
governors or mayors. In total, including the costs of the Asia crisis, the costs of debt have
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levels, most of projects are not viable at their planned toll levels.
The  credibility  of  the  government to  uphold  contractual  obligations  and  their
willingness and ability to provide compensation  for political risks are key issues for private
investors in toll roads. Issues with delays or denials of toll increases have made many
prospective parties wary of entering into new projects. This is especially true for foreign
capital, which is perceived as especially vulnerable to political risks. Some of the more
risky  emerging markets  may  require  support form  multilateral or  bilateral  financial
institutions to reduce this risk exposure. In addition, political risk insurance may help
manage issues of inconvertibility,  transfer and confiscation.  Box 1.3 shows how all of these
risks might be put together by a regulator into a single quantitative indicator.
Box 1.3: How should a regulator  consider risks?
Risk factors can be pulled together in the concept of cost of capital, which represents the required rate of
return that all investors blended together might expect on a project. For most regulatory decisions, a
regulator will have to assess the impact of its decisions  on the cost of capital  through its impact on each one
of the risk levels. Algebraically,  we can simplify and write this as:
Cost  of capital  =
(Required  rate  of return  on debt)  x (Percentage  of debt  in the  project)  +
(Required  rate  of  return  on  equity)  x (Percentage  of equity  in the  project)
Since interest expense typically is tax deductible,  we can calculate  the cost of capital either on a before-tax
or an after-tax  basis. It is important to understand that the tax rate that is relevant is the one that applies to
project sponsors.
The Required Rate of Return on Debt. The required rate of return on debt (that is, the borrowing cost)
includes a number of risk factors, each of which commands a premium that must be paid to investors in
order for them to bear that particular risk:
Required  rate  of return  on debt =
Risk-free  borrowing  rate  for specified  time  horizon  +
Premium  for country/financial  risk  +
Premium  for currency  risk +
Premium  for project  or sector  risk (including  construction)  + Premium  for regulatory  risk
The Required Rate of Return on Equity. Similarly,  the required rate of return on equity investment  can be
seen as being equal to a risk free rate plus a premium for the higher  risk faced by equity relative to debt, as
well as all four risk factors above. The equity risk premium is a fimction of how risky a specific sectoral
investment is relative to  equity markets overall. (This adjustment factor is known as beta and has an
average value 0.6-0.8 for toll roads.) Thus,
Required  rate  of return  on equity  =
Risk-free  borrowing  rate  for specified  time  horizon  +
Equity  risk  premium  (adjusted  by  project  beta)  +
Premium  for country/financial  risk  +
Premium  for currency  risk  +
Premium  for project or sector risk (including construction)+
Premium  for regulatory  risk
While in many cases the risk premiums  required would be similar for debt and equity, this will not always
be the case. For example, regulatory lags in approving  pricing decisions may have a greater effect on equity
holders since creditors have a prior claim.
223.4.8.  OTHER  RISKS
Force Majeure refers to risks that are beyond the control of both public and private
partners, such as floods or earthquakes, which impair the project's ability to earn revenues.
While some private insurance is becoming available for catastrophic  risks, the public sector
generally is faced with the need to restructure  the project should such disasters occur. This
may take the form of extending the concession term, or to provide additional financial
support. The rule is that remedies in the event of force majeure risks should be stated in the
contracts; for example, cash compensation  or an extension of the concession  term equal to
the length of the disturbance. Finally, Tort Liability refers to liability for legal awards as a
result of accidents or negligence on the toll road. This responsibility is borne by the private
sector and is typically covered through private insurance. Governments, however, should
make sure that such coverage is adequate  and that the insuring party is financially sound.
3.5.  REGULATORY OPTIONS FOR MITIGATING RISK
At  the  start of  the  concessioning process, there  are two  main  reasons  for  the
government to commit to support toll road projects at the beginning of a project: (i) to
offset the financial or exchange risks by reducing capital expenditures or  to  improve
revenues to the extent necessary for a project to cover debt service and provide a reasonable
equity return; and (ii) to offset the demand and traffic risk and protect investors (especially
lenders)  from the risk that actual cash flows will fall below expected cash flows and thus be
inadequate to cover debt service. When unexpected events arise and renegotiation of  a
contract arises, these two are often the main problems that a regulator must address. The
name of the game is to come up with a mix of government actions that ensures that an
acceptable financial return can be generated.  These actions may include some redesign of
the financing schemes to include guarantees as well as the redesign of the project design,
including its duration.
3.5.1.  THE VARIOUS INSTRUMENTS A VAILABLE TO A REGULATOR
If public financial support is appropriate, a variety of mechanisms can be used to
support private toll financing. These instruments range from revenue enhancements to
equity guarantees:
*  Equity guarantees:  provide a concessionaire  with the option to be bought out by the
government at a price that guarantees a minimum return on equity. Although the
liability is contingent,  the government  effectively assumes project risk and reduces the
corresponding  private sector incentives.
*  Debt guarantees: guarantee that the government will pay any shortfall related to
principal and interest payments. The government  may also guarantee any refinancing
that is scheduled. This creates significant government exposure and reduces private
sector incentives, although it may decrease the cost or increase the amount of debt
available to the project.
*  Exchange rate guarantees: are when the government agrees to  compensate the
concessionaire  for increases in financing costs due to exchange rate effects on foreign
financing. Exchange rate guarantees expose the government to significant risk and
increase the incentive  to utilize foreign capital.
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liabilities for  the  government. Alternatively, governments can  furnish grants  or
subordinated  loans at project inception,  buying down the size of the project that needs
private finance. (In Chile, the size of the government grant was one of the criteria used
in awarding the South Access toll road concession.)  Alternatively, explicit subsidies
can be given as part of the renegotiation process. In Argentina, this subsidy took the
form of the forgiveness of accumulated  payments due to the government for the right
to operate the concession. In general, these grants or subsidies have no provision for
repayment.
*  Subordinated  loans: can fill a gap in the financing structure between senior debt and
equity. From the government's  perspective, they also have the attractive feature that
they can be repaid with a return if the road is successful. Subordinated  loans improve
feasibility  by increasing the debt service coverage ratio on senior debt and by reducing
the  need for  private  equity, which  requires a  higher return.  However, because
subordinated debt does eventually require repayment, it does not  improve project
feasibility to the same degree as a similarly sized grant. Another alternative would be
for the government to contribute financing that has characteristics of both debt and
equity. One such instrument would be a "reverse  convertible" contribution  that would
remain as equity unless the project was successful, at which point it would convert to
debt for repayment.
As an alternative to these instruments, the regulator could rely on "playing" with
the design of the contract. This involves considering changing the time profile of toll
revenue as well as the toll levels and types, or adjusting the investment specification
and other service obligations  or the contract  duration.
o  Minimum traffic and revenue guarantees: 19 are a relatively common  form of support
for toll  roads where the  government compensates the concessionaire if  traffic or
revenue falls below a minimum threshold. Typically, the threshold is set  10-30%
below the expected volume, and it is generally more desirable to rely on a revenue
guarantee if the goal is to facilitate the access of the operator to the financial market.
This trigger reduces government  exposure while providing sufficient revenue coverage
to support the debt component of the capital structure. In addition, traffic and revenue
guarantees help retain financial incentives in the project, unless conditions deteriorate
well below what was forecast. If the government shares "downside risk" with the
private sector through guarantees, it should also consider seeking instruments that
allow profit on the "upside". One way to do this is with a revenue-sharing  arrangement
where  the government receives a  portion of revenues above  a  maximum traffic
threshold.
*  Shadow tolls: are a way of providing subsidies where the government contributes a
specific payment per vehicle to the concessionaire. In effect, they are an ongoing
revenue stream from the government  in lieu of an up-front grant or loan. Because they
'9 Note that in some countries, such as Chile  for example, minimum  income guarantees  to protect  the operator
are introduced  jointly with a revenue sharing scheme  that allows the government  a 30-50% share  of extra
profits (i.e. revenue that generates  a return in excess of 15%)  when traffic is consistently  above what was
forecast.
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shadow  tolls is that they may not provide investors with much protection from revenue
risks. That is, shadow toll payments are highest when traffic volumes are large. As a
result, government payments may be inadequate to protect investors when traffic is
low and may be unnecessarily high when traffic volumes are high. In addition, the
payment of shadow tolls over time creates a credit risk for concessionaires. These
inefficiencies can be  reduced in  a  number of  ways, such  as by  implementing a
declining payment schedule as volumes increase or a maximum traffic level beyond
which shadow tolls are not paid. Because they tend to  "top off'  private revenues,
shadow tolls may be particularly  valuable as support to low volume roads that require
upgrading  or rehabilitation  rather than new construction.
*  Concession extensions and revenue enhancements: provide financial support that
involves limited public sector  risk, but do little to support or enhance private financing.
First, a government can extend the concession tenn if revenues fall below a certain
amount. Second, a government can restrict competition or allow the development of
ancillary services  by the concessionaire.
*  Changes in contractual obligations: allow the redesign of contractual obligations.
Slower or less investment and fewer service obligations are all ways of cutting costs
and transforming a non-viable  road into a viable one.
3.5.2. CHOOSING  AMONG THESE INSTRUMENTS
In general, the most advantageous types of support for the concessionaire are those
which provide early funding streams (when revenues from the toll road are low or non-
existent  during  the  construction period) and  which  give  guarantees  for  unexpected
problems (for example, exchange rate guarantees). This is true at the time the contract is
initially signed as well as whenever  the regulator is asked to renegotiate to restore financial
viability to a project that has lost its viability.  The least significant  are those that themselves
are unpredictable, i.e., additional rights for development around the road. These various
mechanisms of government support can also be used in combination  when a project is not
feasible on  its  own and where revenue risk is  substantial. In  such cases, grant plus
minimum  revenue  guarantees  may  be  sufficient  to  induce  private  participation.
Governments  should avoid  broad guarantees  that reduce lenders' scrutiny  and due diligence.
In many cases, the availability of these guarantees induced lenders to provide funds based
on guarantees and sponsor strength  rather than underlying  project risks and revenues.
When assessing the value of these adjustments, regulators must recognize that the
value  of  government support also  depends on  the  credibility and  credit risk  of  the
government itself. Investors may be inclined to  discount the value of  various support
mechanisms that have not been upheld in the past, or which are tendered for long periods of
time. Governments also need to improve the management of their contingent liabilities in
order to maintain fiscal credibility and thereby reduce macroeconomic  risks that directly
affect toll roads through traffic volumes and financing costs. On the other hand, it  is
sometimes tempting for governments to increase support far above expected levels when
the sponsors are well connected  politically, have better advisors, or threaten to withdraw at
the last minute. To prevent this requires the government to be  well prepared with the
specification and design of its part in support of that preparation. The upshot is that
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structured requires a detailed analysis of project costs, revenues and risk, as well as an
understanding of what debt and equity investors require. Most regulators have ignored the
importance of this information and have not been able to appropriately monitor or arbitrate
disputes as a consequence. Before bidding a concession, governments should be aware of
the project's critical elements, including environmental  issues, traffic and revenue potential,
preliminary design and costs, permit requirements, and the views of potential investors.
Governments can improve the likelihood of having successful projects by undertaking
studies of these issues and by working with experienced advisers. Box 1.4 tells how Peru
prepared its toll road program effectively. Unfortunately, lack of political commitment to
the program is still delaying its implementation. The regulators will however have all the
required information once the program is implemented,  thanks to an effective preparation.
Box 1.4: Preparing  for a toll road program:  a lesson from Peru
Faced with rapidly growing motorization,  Peru decided in 1997  to launch new initiatives in road transport
and to transform its public tolled highway network into a wider private tolled network. A Special Committee
quickly began the process of selecting consulting firms to undertake studies of the  existing national road
facilities, as well as demand and detailed engineering  studies for an expanded system of national toll roads to
be offered through a system of concessions. Using the existing toll network as  a base for expansion, the
engineering and very preliminary demand studies led the Special Committee to designate twelve prospective
concessions, totaling 6,750 km. Estimated cost for the total network of improvement and expansion is $1.1
billion. Most of the proposed concessions incorporate segments of the existing toll road system. Each new
proposal develops a plan for upgrades and expansion, and then grafts an additional new segment on to this
"base" road. The result is a set of concessions for which prospective traffic volumes will vary enormously
over the different road segments. This creates concessions that, by design, have included cross-subsidies of
low density segments with high density ones. The essential assumptions of this preliminary study included a
traffic growth rate of 3-5%/o/year,  periodic maintenance  costs per kilometer every five years between $10,400
and $14,500 depending on the road; rehabilitation costs around US$100,000/km and reconstruction costs of
US$350,000/km. Tolls would be set at $2.00/100 km and would automatically be adjusted for inflation and
exchange rates. (The precise mechanism for dealing with the interaction of  inflation and exchange rates
remains to be settled.)
These assumptions allowed an estimate of the net present value of toll revenues (net of operating and
maintenance requirements). Subtracting  the estimated net present value of net toll revenue from the estimated
net present value of the investment (excluding  land costs) yields the estimated new present value of each road
project. Only three of the eleven projects have positive net present values at a  15% real discount rate in
dollars. Those three proposed concessions incorporate sizable amounts of the existing toll network, and as
such, face relatively low expenditures on land and improvements.  It is important to note that even on the
perimeter of Lima, high investment  costs overwhelm higher  traffic density.
The preliminary studies indicated that low traffic volumes and large required investments would not
allow concessions to be let on the basis of financial payments to the government. As a result, a negative
concession  plan was developed.  Concessions  would be bid on the basis of the lowest amount of investment  to
be made by the central government and would run 25-30 years, with subsequent transfer of the roads to the
government. The government's contribution  would not be considered as part of the equity in the concession.
The government  would delegate the responsibility for the enforcement  of the contract to a transport regulatory
agency OSITRANS,  which would resolve disputes or pass them on to the judicial system.
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The concession agreement is  the principal contract governing a  private  toll road
project. It can be designed in many ways. In some countries, the governments provide
many of the details in the information sets provided to the bidders and the bids are for very
specific proposals. In  others, the government asks the bidders to  make many  of  the
suggestions to implement the road. Whatever the sequence, here is a minimum list that
needs to be covered by the overall contract packages to allow the regulator to referee in
case  of  conflicts  between users  and  the  concessionaire or  the  government  and  the
concessionaire:
* A  Definition of  the legal context. Toll road projects, whether wholly private or
mixed in character, require a  clear legal context defined by well-drafted laws and
regulations regarding concessions.21  Since there are many different forms of toll road
development, such legislation may be general in character, enabling different types of
private participation. Why should a regulator care? Because these laws must clearly
identify the respective  rights and obligations of the private and public sectors, which is
a crucial element of the settlement of any dispute between the concession agency and
the concessionaires. It is also fundamental  that these rights and obligations be seen as
valid, binding and enforceable through a legal process that is fair, timely and not
overly costly. In addition, the regulator needs to be informed of the way that the toll
road program is integrated with national, regional and local transport policies and is
enabled by a concession law. It is important for an effective toll road program to be
coordinated with broader transport and road policies. The entire process should be
designed to be competitive,  transparent and based on reasonable evaluation criteria.
*  The Administrative background. As with any type of contract, it is crucial for the
regulator to be able to refer to a set of definitions for all of the key concepts covered in
the contract; including items such as the definition of the concession area, the zone of
added services, maintenance,  what constitutes force majeure, what constitutes basic or
special services,  the key monetary and technical units, the standards to be used, and the
key  players  involved in  the  sector. From  a  regulatory viewpoint,  of  particular
importance is the specification by the contract of those events that would constitute
default on the part of each party, including remedies and the procedures for obtaining
compensation. Finally, the administrative requirement may also have to  provide a
definition of  what  constitutes the  basic documents that  give all  of  the required
information to all parties involved. The minimum set includes the explanation of the
administrative, technical and financial requirements. Increasingly, countries are also
including in this definition any ulterior clarification  to be issued as a result of mistakes
identified by potential bidders when reviewing the documents. Taken together, these
documents provide the basis of the information  to be used by the regulator.
*  Estimate of the costs of the project. The regulator needs to get an idea of the value
of the task at stake. In some cases, this results in the unit costs and the maximum cost
20 See also G. Fishbein and S. Babbar, Private Financing of Toll Roads, RMC Discussion Paper 117,
(Washington: World  Bank, December 1996),  pp. 34-36.
21 The policy framework should address the types of roads targeted for tolling,  the types of organizational
structures allowed, and which govermment  entities are responsible  for overseeing the program.
27of the project as estimated by independent engineers, which is also to be specified in
the bidding documents to  provide a benchmark. Often, the government will have
several independent  studies that include demand and as well as cost studies.
*  The asset valuation rules. The government should be interested in the way in which
the assets are evaluated for fiscal reasons as well as for regulatory reasons. Indeed, the
value of business will be at the core of many regulatory decisions involving the toll
level or the duration of the contract.
*  The economic content of the technical documents. The technical documents must at
least cover a few items that the economic regulator needs in order to  sort out the
financial and economic consequences  of the operator's actions, whether imposed by
the bidding documents or proposed as part of the bid.  The main aspects are the
investment and  maintenance plan  and  timetable and  the  toll  system description
(including technology and location). They should also cover information on weights
allowed for  each  type  of  vehicle, which  is  relevant for  the  calculation of  the
maintenance costs and the related toll levels. The rules of the game for the evaluation
of these technical bids should also be clearly defined to allow the regulator to settle
any related dispute.
*  The  various  types  of  guarantees/warranties. This  section  frequently includes
requirements regarding insurance, performance bonds, minimum equity contributions
and corporate structure. They may apply to all stages of the process (offer, construction
and operation) and generally cover specific amounts for the various stages and apply to
both the concessionaire and the government. For the government, they may include
commitments regarding approvals and right-of-way  permits, expropriations, etc. These
sections provide one way of telling the regulator how much is at stake in the decisions
regarding compliance with obligations on all parts to the contract. In principle, the
guarantees should have an economic meaning in the sense that the amounts involved
should somehow be related to the risks of non-compliance,  but in practice, they seldom
are related. They tend to  be  somewhat arbitrary amounts, negotiated to  be  "large
enough" to induce private participation  or financing.
- The identification of the various types of risks and their distribution between the
parts.  This section typically covers the specific responsibilities of  each party for
funding, acquiring and preparing the right-of-way, including risks of delay or cost
overruns. It also includes responsibilities  for developing and constructing the project,
including environmental compliance, permits and  designs. The agreement should
address the risk borne by each party in the event of unplanned events such as delays
and  cost  overruns. In  addition, the agreement should address the possibility that
financing  will  not  be  raised.  The  contract also  should  specify  any  rights  or
responsibilities  of the concessionaire  to modify or expand  the road in the future beyond
the requirements of the initial concession.  The agreement should specify the conditions
under which profits or revenues are shared with the government. For example, if a
maximum traffic or revenue ceiling is used, the agreement should state the maximum
traffic or revenue threshold for each year of the  concession, the  revenue sharing
formula, and  the  procedure for  calculating and  transferring the  payment to  the
government. If incentive provisions are used, the agreement should specify the events
that would trigger the incentive  payment and the size and timing of such payments.
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concessionaire's exclusive right to design, build, finance and operate the project during
the concession period, which will provide the regulator with basic benchmarks to
assess  compliance  with  commitments. The  contract  should  include  the  service
obligations (i.e., farmers can use some portion of  the road  for  free) and  related
compensations to  which the  operator is  entitled, the  conditions under  which the
concession may be  extended or  amended, any  payments required  either  by  the
concessionaire or by the government;  and specifications  as to who holds the legal title
and  how  any  transfer  will  occur.  The  concession  contract  should  define  the
responsibilities of each party for operations, including toll collection, maintenance,
enforcement and safety, auxiliary services and administration. Also, any mechanisms
committed by the government to support the project should be  made explicit (and
ideally, formula-driven),  including magnitude,  timing of payments, duration of support
and conditions under which support is phased out or withdrawn. Specific facilities such
as  connecting  roads  or  interchanges that  the  government  or  concessionaire  is
committed to provide should be addressed, including dates and remedies in case of
delays or  nonperformance. This  section also  should  define  the  recourse of  the
concessionaire should the government not honor its financial commitments under the
agreement.
*  The penalty rules. In addition to relying on the threat of cashing-in deposits for
guarantees, regulators need to have access to  a clear set of fines which relate the
penalty for non-compliance on more operational matters to the damage resulting from
the non-compliance. Here, the practice seems to be to set pre-defined amounts for
specific types of violations to minimize the arbitrariness of regulatory decisions. The
concession contract for Road 5 from Santiago to Talca identifies and defines 81 types
of violations and specifies the amounts involved and the application criteria (i.e. every
day, every time,  etc.). To the  extent possible, and to  make it  easier to  regulate,
established performance standards  should relate to the penalties for noncompliance.
*  The regulatory regime. The regulatory approach and enforcement mechanism must
be specified. If rate of return regulation is used, the agreement must specify the basis
for the regulation,  the maximum rate of return allowed, and the calculations required to
monitor the concession performance. If toll rate regulation is used, the agreement
should specify the maximum toll by vehicle type, the index used to adjust toll rates,
and the time period for toll rate adjustments. Some degree of creativity is allowed here.
In Peru,  for instance, the standard formula is  adjusted to  include a  premium for
improvements in safety over the targets spelled out in the contract. The contract also
should include the specific procedure for calculating and revising the toll  schedule
(See section below for additional discussion of the specific pricing rules.).
*  The information the operator will be required to provide to the regulator. The
contract should specify the type and timing of information to  be provided to  the
government to monitor the agreement. The contract should also specify the conditions
under which the regulator can ask for additional information that is not covered by the
contract. Typically, the operator will be asked to provide the regulator with monthly
data reports on hourly, daily and monthly vehicle flows, classified per vehicle type, as
well as monthly data reports on congestion, accidents and changes in regular traffic
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information on  any related service obligation imposed by the contract. Every six
month, the regulator should expect reports on maintenance costs, actions taken and
total and unit costs, as well as a report on paving  progress if specified in the contract .
*  The acceptance conditions. The contract should specify the conditions under which
the government will accept the completed facility and approve the start of operation.
This is particularly important when tolling is scheduled to begin before the project is
completed. In Brazil, this approach provided a means to generate early revenue, while
allowing the public to see the improved road before having to pay for it through tolls.
*  Limitations on competing  facilities. The contract should specify the corridor, if any,
under which the government is restricted from constructing, expanding, or granting
concessions for competing  roads or other facilities. As mentioned earlier, the existence
of parallel free roads is a matter of concern for many operators and regulators may
have to arbitrate challenges  by governments  to operate almost parallel routes.
*  Rights to access third party operated  facilities. The contract should spell out any
specific rights of the concessionaire to access land or roads owned by third party
activities as part of the concession, including how this access should be paid for. In
most conflicting events, the regulator will be called to assess the access pricing rule
demanded by the owner of the facility to be shared.
- Assignment and termination of the concession. The regulator also needs to have
clear instructions on the terms and conditions under which the concession may be
transferred to  a party other than the original concessionaire, including the specific
conditions  under  which  the  concessionaire or  the  government  can  cancel  the
concession and the consequences  of termination, including penalties and replacement.
*  The Renegotiation rule. Renegotiation happens. It is in fact quite common and the
contracts should be  quite clear and try  to have pre-established rules to  avoid the
conflictive situations that were frequently observed in the first part of the 1990s across
infrastructure contracts. More recent contracts spell out these rules quite carefully in
Latin America. Chile's example discussed  in Box 1.5 may be the best so far.
Contract design should be as specific as possible with respect to ongoing adjustments
for inflation, etc., so that these risks are handled routinely. However, project risks and
uncertainty in the economic and financial environment  will inevitably create situations
that  require  contract renegotiation. The  concession contract should  specify the
conditions that would allow the contract terms to be renegotiated, what type of event
could trigger renegotiation and how frequently reviews can occur. However, project
risks and uncertainty in the economic and financial environment will inevitably create
situations that require contract renegotiation. The contract also should specify what
remedies  are  available to  the  regulator for  restructuring. For  example, whether
concession length might be extended or an investment program might be modified.
Too  often, contract renegotiation has been initiated for a  specific issue and then
expanded to other issues. This approach is prone to corruption and creates incentives
for sponsors to seek contract revisions on a regular basis.
30Box 1.5 Rule-based renegotiations:  lessons from Chile
In order to provide flexibility  without compromising  the interests of the concessionaire,  the Chilean Contracts
include detailed  procedures to constraint and assess financially  government  requests for additional work. The
government  can demand additional  work for up to a maximum of 20% of the initial official cost estimate of
the project, up to two years before the concession ends. During the construction stage, additional work can
only be demanded for up to 5% of the official cost estimate and new investment at that stage is valued
according to a unitary pricing schedule contained  in the tendering documents.  Bidders implicitly accept these
unitary costs when they participate  in the franchising  process.
The valuation of new investments  required during the operational  phase must be agreed between the Ministry
of Public Works and the concessionaire.  If they do not agree, differences must be settled based on technical
reports produced by consultants  from each party. The compensation  can be through increased  tolls; increased
duration of the concession;  or direct payments  by the state.
To avoid conflicts the most recent concessions  place explicit restrictions  on the compensation  mechanism. For
example, in the Rio Bueno-Puerto  Montt concession, tariff increases during the life of the contract cannot
exceed 25% and the increase in concession  duration cannot be exceed 120 months. Furthermore, an explicit
formula is included in the contract  to calculate  the required compensation.  This is given by:
N+S  V  -r  N+S  C
NW  =  k  +  E(  -k =k(l+  r)k  i=÷(  +r)k
where: Ik  =  Additional investment in period k;  N  =  Initial duration of concession; S =  Extension of
contract and Y, = Additional income due to increase  in tariffs, where:
y  =J  p, P,Q-, + G,  t =k +l,...,  N
(I  (+  p, )P, Q, + G,  t= N+l,...,N+  S
and P,  =  Tolls prior to compensation; Q, =  Projected  traffic levels for new investment  at initial toll levels;
p,  =  Percentage increase in tolls;  G,  = Direct payments by state; C,  =  Operational and maintenance
costs associated with new investment; T, = Taxes due on additional  toll income; r  =  Discount rate
The additional operational and maintenance  costs, the projected traffic levels and the discount rate must be
based on an expert's report. If disagreements  arise over these parameters, the Conciliatory Commission  must
be convened. However, the tender documents are usually more explicit on how to estimate the discount rate
and they place an upper limit on the risk premium  that the concessionaire  can receive.
In order to avoid imposing additional traffic risks on the concessionaire,  there is a payment at the end of the
concession to compensate  for the difference  between the projected  traffic levels used in the above calculations
and the real traffic level observed.  This compensation  is calculated  as:
RN+S  =  E  -T  -(  '  E)*(1+r)N+S-k
t=k+i  (1+r
where the '^'  symbol indicates the ex-post real value observed of the variable. There is no compensation,
however, for operational and maintenance costs that differ from  the original estimates. Otherwise, the
concessionaire  would have an incentive  to inflate  these costs in order to receive extra compensation  at the end
of the concession  period. However, these costs are usually small in comparison  to investments. Differences
between the expert's estimate  used to calculate  the compensation  and real ex-post  costs are unlikely  to have a
significant affect on the profitability  of the concession.
Source:  Gomez-Lobo and Hinojosa  (1999)
31. Dispute  resolution. The agreement should explain the  procedures for  settling
disputes in a fair and timely manner, including provisions for arbitration or mediation.
Foreign concessionaires may request that such disputes be  resolved in  a  neutral
jurisdiction. This was recognized by Peru in its recent draft contracts and they now
standardly include  a  clause  explaining how  disputes will  be  settled  and  when
international  arbitration will be used. In a nutshell, technical conflicts will be resolved
locally by an expert (picked randomly if the parties cannot agree to one) and non-
technical  conflicts  over  a  certain amount will  be  resolved  by  an  international
arbitration commission. Below  that  amount, they  are resolved locally.  All  local
decisions are taken within specific time limits. In Chile, the main dispute settlement
mechanism  is the Conciliatory  Commission.  This Commission  has three members, one
nominated  by the concessionaire,  one by the authorities  and the third by mutual accord.
Members of the Commission  must be nominated at the beginning of the concession
before any controversies  have arisen. The Commission  is established when one of the
parties raises a demand.  In the case of the state, contracts  stipulate  an explicit and limited
set  of  circumstances whereby  it  can  raise  a  demand to  the  Commission. The
concessionaire  has more flexibility in this respect. The Commission's initial task is to
conciliate  the diverging  positions.  If an agreement  is not reached,  the concessionaire,  and
only the concessionaire,  has the choice  of either taking the matter  to the  judicial system  or
requesting the establishment  of the Arbitration Commission.  This last Commission is
formed  by the same members  as the Conciliatory  Commission  and its decision  is binding
and not subject  to appeal in the courts.  22
3.7. TOLL  ROAD AUCTIONS  AND  AWARD CRITERIA
As in most infrastructure sectors, competition in the road sector is essentially  for the
market. Since the toll franchise  has a degree of exclusivity, the auction is a crucial element
to help ensure that services are being provided efficiently. Given the complexity of road
infrastructure projects and the diversity of objectives road agencies tend to have for their
projects, it is often difficult for governments to come up with an ideal bidding rule. The
diverse approaches that have been used are shown in Table  1.4. Many countries have
adopted a two-stage process in which technical proposals are evaluated separately from and
prior to financial proposals. The winning bidder is then selected from those who pass the
technical evaluation.
While technical validation helps reduce the risk of project failure, it may also have
important drawbacks. It  often  involves considerable discretion and judgment  by  the
evaluation committee, which reduces the overall transparency of the process. Experience
also has shown that changing market conditions after the contract award may require
operators to  make  significant changes to  the  project; and  these  changes reduce the
meaningfulness  of the initial technical evaluations  to the extent that they relied on the base
forecasts.
22  For more details on Chile, see A. Gomez-Lobo  and S. Hinojosa,  "Broad  Roads in a Thin Country:
Infrastructure Concessions in Chile," mimeo, World  Bank Institute, April 1999
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To remedy this, many governments  are issuing a preliminary  set of technical  standards
to  be achieved,  which  is subject to discussion  and modification  with prospective  bidders.
This has been  Chile's  experience.23 Interaction  often takes place with the regulator,  which
is desirable  since the  regulator  will eventually  be responsible  for monitoring  compliance.
After this  consultation,  the  bidding  package  is finalized  so  that  parties  bid on  the  same
technical  specifications  and  requirements  and  the  winner  is  picked  from  the  financial
proposal. This is wonderful from a regulator's  viewpoint  since, if there are enough potential
bidders  participating  in  the  discussion  and  there  is  no  collusion  between  the  various
bidders,  the  process  converges  toward  what  could  be  defined  a  "consensus  engineering
cost". The regulator  now has some idea of what best practice  investment,  maintenance  and
operation costs should be for a specific road.
This is not the end of it. There are still many different  options for structuring  financial
proposals for road concessions. Some of the more common options include:
*  Lowest toll level;
*  Shortest duration of the concession;
*  Highest Payment to the government for existing infrastructure; and
*  Lowest subsidy required from the government;
Less  common  options  include  the  lowest  income  guarantee  requested  from  the
government  or the  amount of new  investment and/or its speed, as well as some innovative
ideas discussed later. It is interesting that as regulators learn about past mistakes, there  is an
evolution in the way toll roads are being auctioned.
23 See A. Gomez-Lobo and S. Hinojosa, 1999.
333.7.1 THE INITiAL EXPERIENCES WITH CO.MPETITIONFOR  THE MARKETFOR TOLL ROADS
The earliest road concessions  (such as the first generation  of Argentine and Chilean  toll
roads) were trying to  be everything to  everyone and were awarded following complex
weighted  multiple  criteria  picked from the list  just described.  This was a source of opaque  and
often subjective  if not corrupt  decision-making.  Next, when governments  started to see that
simpler  is better and decided  to focus  on a single  criteria,  bidding  tended to be based either on
the minimum toll (as in the second generation  of Argentine toll roads) or, if the toll was
specified,  the shortest duration  for the franchise  (as in the initial Mexican toll road program).
Both of these approaches  presented  significant  incentive  problems.  Bidding  on the basis of the
minimum toll may result in  poor price signals in congested corridors. If  tolls are set
exclusively  to cover investment,  maintenance  and operating  costs, then high tolls result when
low traffic volumes  are expected  and low tolls result  in high traffic and congested  conditions.
Similarly,  bidding based on the shortest  concession  period also has problems,  especially
if tolls are not specified. In Mexico, where projects were tendered based on the shortest
concession  duration offered by firms for a given traffic flow, shorter concession durations
necessitated  the setting of higher  tolls in order to finance  the projects.  The resulting  high tolls
produced important traffic diversions and many complaints  to regulators from users with
limited ability to pay. It did not help that Mexico required alternative  freeways for each
concession.  The ultimate outcome  was a financial situation  so catastrophic  that it required a
subsequent  government  bailout for many roads.
Bidding on the basis of  investment commitments has been used to  develop road
networks,  but this has also had problems  that often  result in demands  for renegotiation  by the
operators. By locking in future investment levels, the concessionaire  is prevented from
adjusting investment  to meet changing market conditions. Second, it may encourage over-
optimism  and excessive  investment  (see Box 1.6).
Box 1.6: Why were consortia  initially  so optimistic about road projects?
Regulators  also need to understand  the motivation  behind the optimism, since in many cases the outcome of
excessive optimism  is renegotiation.  Indeed,  many of the earlier  road concessions  have experienced problems.
Concessionaires  have been either overly optimistic or overly aggressive in bidding, leading to  a  host of
restructuring  and renegotiations.  There are several  reasons  why firms pursue  this strategy:
*  There is a "first mover" advantage  to grab when several  projects  are going to be concessioned.  By winning
the first  bid, firms signal  that their low cost or aggressive  behavior  to other  bidders,  with the goal of discouraging
future  competition.
*  Since construction firms are often the key consortium partner, construction contracts rather than the
subsequent  operation  of the concession  are the dominant  interest,  and bidding  below cost secures the construction
contracts,  with disregard  to the long-term  financial  viability  of the concession  which will be the problem of the
other consortium  members  or of the creditors.
*  Firms may bid low just to win the franchise with the sincere intention  of renegotiating the conditions  of
the contract as soon as possible. Few governments  have refused to renegotiate. Indeed, if the concession  runs
into financial problems in the future, there are associated political  problems as well as costs and delays in re-
tendering the project. Therefore, bidding low and renegotiating afterwards may be a viable strategy for a
potential concessionaire  (a phenomenon  called  "low balling").
*  Finally, one cannot rule out optimization  mistakes on the part of bidders, possibly related to the poor
assessment  of demand  uncertainty  (winner's  curse),  or the complexity  of tendering  mechanisms.
Source:  Based on Gomez-Lobo  and Hinojosa  (1999)
343.7.2 THE NEWIMPROVED  COmPETITiONFOR  THE TOLL ROADS  ARKETS
In the wake of the bailouts,  new schemes  have been  developed  to improve  incentives  and
reduce  the risks  of road concessions.  In Peru,  bidding  has taken place in terms  of the minimum
amount  of required  government  investment  in each concession.  This serves  to "buy down" the
size of the project and reduce  the financial  risk exposure  of the concessionaire.  In Britain,  the
Design-Build-Finance-Operate  (DBFO) scheme  establishes  the payment of "shadow  tolls" by
the  government based on  traffic volumes. This  provides a  long-term mechanism for
government  support  that phases  out as traffic volume  grows.
Perhaps  the most innovative  road concession  programs  have been developed  in Chile. As
a reaction to  the low bidding problem, Chile tendered its Route 5 Temuco-Rio Bueno
concession on the basis of a minimum toll, within a band set by the government. The floor of
the  band  is  set  sufficiently high  to  guarantee a  minimum  revenue  stream  to  the
concessionaire.  In addition, the duration of the contract is fixed in the bidding documents.
Setting this minimum toll level and the duration of the contract effectively puts a floor on
the expected earnings of the concession company. Therefore, the risk of future financial
distress for the concession firm (which would force the government to  renegotiate the
contract) is minimized. If two or more firms bid the minimum  value, the winner is the one
that offers the highest transfer directly  to the government. 24
In effect, this bidding mechanism  significantly  reduces  the chance of renegotiation, but
does not lower the competitive  pressure of the process. It is possible that sponsors may still
try to renegotiate the contract ex-post, but they will not have one of their main bargaining
chips at their disposal;  namely, that the concession  firm is effectively in financial distress. 25
It is unlikely that governments  will feel pressure to renegotiate  because the financial results
of the (possibly international)  sponsors  are negative.  If the concession  firn is in good shape
and there are no risks of disruption to its activities due to financial distress, governments
should be better equipped to resist re-negotiation pressures.  This transfer mechanism from
sponsors has served to generate close to US$150 million in the four concessions where it
has been used. The proceeds are deposited in an Infrastructure Fund that is then used to
cross-subsidize  other projects or pay for minimum  income guarantees.
3.7. 3  THE NEWEST FORMS OF COMPETITION FOR THE MARKET.
Chile also has pioneered, at least academically, another bidding approach that holds
some promise for dealing with the fixed-term  nature of traditional franchising contracts and
that is being considered in Colombia  and Mexico for both roads and airport runways. 26 The
bidding variable, instead of toll levels or anther conventional  variable, is the present value
24  Because  this transfer does not affect the income or capital  structure of the concession  firm, sponsors can bid
as much as they like without  jeopardizing the fmancial stability  of the concession.  If investors make a mistake
and bid too much, the consequent  loss will show up in the sponsor's financial returns, not the concession
company. For much more detail, see Gomez-Lobo  and Hinojosa.
25 Engel, Fisher and Galetovic in several of their articles point out that the LPVR auction may also reduce the
occurrence of low-balling.  Their argument rests on the assumption  that the LPVR bid of the winning firm
offers the government  a credible threat to terminate  the concession  quickly and compensate  the firm if it tries
to renegotiate. This will be discussed  further below in relation to the LPVR auction mechanism.
26 Britain was the first country  to apply a variable length concession  with an LPVR flavor in the Severn Trent
and Dartford Bridge concessions
35of  revenue throughout the  life of  the concession that  firms  are willing to  accept to
undertake the project. The firm that bids the lowest present value of revenue wins. The
duration of the concession is then flexible and depends on the effective traffic  levels
encountered. Once the concessionaire  has received (in present value terms) the amount that
he bid, the concession ends and the infrastructure  reverts to public ownership. If real traffic
levels are lower than expected, the duration of the concession is extended automatically,
while if traffic is higher than expected, the opposite occurs. Therefore, income uncertainty
due to traffic variations is largely eliminated  for the concessionaire.
In  addition,  the  LPVR auction  reduces potential  conflicts  related  to  the  early
termination of a concession. In a ten to thirty year contract, excessive traffic growth or
other events may occur that require added investments. It would be optimal to cancel the
original contract and  re-tender the concession with  the extended projects, rather than
negotiate the additional investments with the existing concessionaire.  This seldom happens
because it would require a  difficult estimation of compensation for the forgone future
income stream owed for an early termination of the contract. The LPVR auction reduces
this problem substantially by giving the concessionaire the difference between what he
originally bid and what he has already earned. From the viewpoint of a regulator, another
important characteristic of the LPVR mechanism is that tolls can be  adjusted without
having to negotiate new terms with the concessionaire.  If tolls are deemed too high or low,
the authorities could change them without affecting the concessionaire's expected income
stream and without engaging in a potentially protracted negotiation process. As stressed in
EFG (1997a), this flexibility may be important in urban road concessions where it may be
very difficult to determine the optimal  tariff ex-ante, especially  during congestion periods.
The  LPVR mechanism also  has  its  drawbacks. It  may  lower  the  incentive  of
concessionaires  to make demand-enhancing  investments  such as quality improvements.  The
increase in demand from these expenditures results in an earlier termination of the contract,
with little benefit to the concessionaire. 27 Perhaps a more important difficulty is that the
LPVR auction does not resolve possible cash flow problems  that a concessionaire  may face
when traffic levels drops.
Another  limitation occurs  in  cases  where  operation  and  maintenance costs  are
relatively high compared to construction costs. A situation of low traffic then puts the
concessionaire in trouble since the extension of the contract generates increasingly high
maintenance costs which eventually may make the project unsustainable. Hence, although
the risk of demand is reduced under LPVR, it is not completely eliminated. Bidders still
have to estimate the future level of traffic to compute their required revenue. A possible
way to refine the LPVR mechanism is to require bidders to provide separate offers for
construction and average annual operating costs. 28
27 Early termination of the contract would save the concessionaire  the additional maintenance and operation
costs that would have been incurred during the original period, but these are usually small.
28 For more details on this refinement,  see de Rus and Nombela (1999)
364. PRICE REGULATION
One of the main reasons why toll projects fail is that privatization teams have a hard
time assessing demand prospects. In turn, one of the main reasons why demand prospects
are hard to  assess is that traffic levels often depend on the what economists call the
elasticity of demand with respect to price, i.e. how sensitive  demand is to changes in prices.
In practice, this matters a lot, particularly in developing countries where the ability to pay is
often limited and regulators are sometimes expected to make recommendations based on
the social impact of pricing decisions. This explains why there are so many differences in
toll design and toll levels across countries. In principle, they have to reflect costs, but the
specific costs to be covered can vary (construction/rehabilitation  costs, operations costs,
maintenance costs, environmental costs, safety costs, congestion costs). In general, the first
three types  of  costs have been reflected in  the toll  calculation, and  the last two  are
beginning to be incorporated..  Environmental  costs have tended to be included only to the
extent that they entitle specific recoverable  expenditures  by the operator.
Table 1.5 shows that in general, countries tend to fix the toll levels needed to recover
investment, operation and maintenance costs. It shows that the price cap is now a common
form of regulation in the sector  just as in many of the others. The last column suggests that
in many cases, they end up restructuring  the toll levels at some point (jointly with subsidies
to the toll operators or the extension  of a contract  term). These contractual changes are such
that price caps are transformed into rate of return regulation, since the main purpose of the
adjustment is to shift part of the risk imposed on the operator through price cap back to the
users (through longer contracts) or to the government  (through subsidies).
Argentina-  road corridors  Fixed  1.56  Yes
Aentina-  urb*a  acce  Capped  3.5  Yes
0BrIl- Feral  Capped  2.3-5  Yes
Chi£01glle-  generation:  0  t  l  Capped  2-3  No
1Zolowbia  - generationFixed  3-4  No
Mexo  pFixed  2-11  Yes
Mexico  private  toll roads  Fixed  13-50  Yes
Ur  gay X <  ;j;00VgtjWfgiji  ;y:f;:;  Fixed  3.5  Yes
Venezue;a  Fixed  1  No
ources: Irigoyen, J.L. (1999), Toll Road Development  in Latin America, presentation  at the Seminar on Asian
oil Road Development in an Era of Financial  Crisis, Tokyo, March 9-11, and various World Bank internal
eports
The uncertainty with respect to the introduction  of direct pricing in the sector is one of
the main concerns that road operators  have to address and regulators have to understand. In
defining the regulation  of prices, the following  challenges  must be tackled:
*  Question 1: How much should the operator recover through the toll system? More
specifically, what is the level investment the operator should be allowed to recover,
given current and forecast traffic levels? Unfortunately, this investment is a moving
target since roads tend to alternate between excess capacity at off-peak times and
congestion and capacity shortfalls at peak time. This problem also arises in a longer
37term sense. Indeed, since it takes time to build road capacity,  what appears to be excess
capacity today may meet demand in five years time and it makes sense, to minimize
costs over time, for an operator and a government to take some bets (for example, a
four-lane bridge may only cost 50-60% more than a  two-lane bridge). This  is, of
course, often also a political challenge  that a regulator has to justify since opposition to
tolls is  sometimes based  on the excess capacity observed at the beginning. One
solution to minimize the perception  of overcharging  is to allow the operator to look for
alternative sources of financing from sub-concessions  such as gas stations, restaurants,
playgrounds or advertising, but these seldom yield much more than 5-10% of the
revenue needed.
*  Question 2: Should tolls be  fixed or should they vary greatly during the lifetime of
the investment? 29 This is a complex regulatory question  with multiple dimensions  and
viewpoints.
o  The economist's answer will be that when a facility first opens, the optimal
price will be close to zero, or at least very low since it only needs to cover operation
and maintenance, because the road, which was sized for future traffic growth, will
be uncongested in the early years and hence it has a negligible marginal cost. Later,
as traffic builds up, congestion and the optimal road price will grow as well. But
when traffic reaches the maximum and new road capacity is added, the optimal
price will again fall sharply.
o  The typical politician's answer will be to keep the toll stable. The domination
of this position around the world is reflected in the vast majority of "fixed tolls"
identified throughout Latin America as seen in Table 1.5. The consequence of fixed
tolls is that road operators tend to overcharge in the early years and undercharge
later.30
o  The economic  problem is, in practice, under control, since many contracts now
have toll escalation clauses (generally subject to regulatory approval, but in some
cases automatic) that are related to a local consumer or construction price index,
increasingly calculated  in dollars, to offset the potential effects of a devaluation.
o  In addition, there is an increased recognition that the option to price congestion
is  a  good one  and this  eases the possibility of future toll  increases. In  many
countries, peak and off-peak tolls are already different. In the longer run, a larger
share of the day will end up being considered  peak time and hence ease the recovery
of revenue needed to cover higher maintenance  costs resulting from higher traffic.
Once more, the ideal arrangement for a regulator is to have to ensure compliance
with formula driven adjustments.
o  Finally, it may be worth pointing out that the answer to this question depends
largely on the amortization rules allowed for the road operator. If, for whatever
fiscal reason, the operator can follow a fast track amortization for investment in a
road, the toll will be high at the beginning and lower once the road is amortized
29  Economists  refer to this problem as the difference  between short-run  and long-run marginal costs.
30 This pricing problem is made worse in many cases by debt service requirements that are concentrated  in the
middle years of a facility's life. Such financing  burdens are even greater for developing countries with limited
access  to long-term capital markets.
38fiscally, since the only expenses left to recover are operation and maintenance. The
monitoring  and  possibly  definition of  these  amortization rules  is  one  of  the
responsibilities of the regulator in  this  sector, as  in  most of  the other sectors.
Without clear rules, it is one of the instruments that operators use to argue for toll
increases to strategically  distribute costs over time.
Question 3: Should the regulator require toll to be differentiated across users?
There are several dimensions  to differentiation  that can be considered.
o  The different road damages imposed by different vehicles. This arises because
autos and trucks impose different requirements  on roads (see Box 1.7 for a technical
explanation), which is why most concession  contracts allow at least some degree of
differentiation between cars  and  trucks/buses. In  practice,  unit tolls  will vary
according to the number of axles on the vehicle as an approximation for the "wear
and tear" imposed by each vehicle on the road pavement. In general, trucks and
buses are charged two to four times the level of auto tolls, with the precise amounts
varying depending on size, weight, traffic mix and development objectives.
o  The  political viability of differentiating  tariffs across regions of a same country.
In many countries, tolls/km are imposed to be the same across a country because
some politicians find it difficult to have to explain that inter-regional toll differences
can be justified by differences in construction and maintenance costs. As explained
earlier, this means that explicit subsidies may sometimes be required or that cross-
subsidies need to be tolerated for some operators, but this also means that regulators
must have access to sufficiently detailed cost data to ensure that there is no abuse
and that users are not overcharged
o  Social pricing. In many poor countries around the world, the main interurban
roads are likely to be important infrastructures  for rural users who need to take their
products to urban centers. This represents serious social concerns, as well as strong
interest  groups with political clout. This  may be  why it is  quite common for
governments to impose a special treatmnent  of some user groups and to have their
use of the roads financed through some type of shadow  toll or subsidy/voucher.  This
is one of the solutions considered in Peru, for instance, to address farmers' protests
against the tolling of some highways. Similarly, for urban access roads, it makes
sense to allow lower tolls for the users of public transportation, since very often
these are likely to  include the poor, and  in addition, the use of buses reduces
congestion and pollution.
39Box 1.7: A brief  lesson in engineering  for the price  regulator
Costs,  and hence  toll differentiation,  should  be driven  by the demands  that different  vehicles  place  on
the shared  road. Highway  costs can be divided  into two types:  the basic capacity  to carry  traffic  and
pavement  durability  and smoothness.  Civil  engineers  measure  the demands  that different  vehicle  types
place  on capacity  relative  to that  of a standard  passenger  car (known  as PCE,  or passenger  car equivalent
units).  The number  of PCEs  of capacity  needed  by a heavy  truck  varies  according  to terrain  and other
factors.  For example,  on a level  road, a truck  may only  represent  the equivalent  of 1.2  cars,  while  on a
moderate-grade  road,  the lower  horsepower-to-weight  ratio  of trucks  might  make  them  the equivalent  of
four passenger  cars. The number  of lanes,  lane width,  grades,  curves  and other factors  determine  the
traffic-carrying  capacity  of a road. Pavement  durability  is determined  by the type of pavement,  its
thickness  and  the stresses  to which  it has  been  subject  since  construction.
Road  damage  is a function  not of the size of the vehicle,  but of the weight  being  borne  on the axles  of a
vehicle.  Road  engineers  measure  the demands  that  different  vehicle  types place  on roads  in terms  of the
damage  caused  by the passage  of a reference  axle  weighing  18,000  pounds,  approximately  the weight  on
axles  on many heavy trucks.  This  is known  as an equivalent  standard  axle-load,  or ESAL.  Pavement
damage  increases  at the third or fourth  power  of axle  weight,  so  that the 1,000-pound  axle loading  on a
typical  car produces  only  about  1/10,000  the pavement  damage  of a typical  heavy  truck  axle. This  non-
linear  damage  impact  is offset  to some  degree  by the fact that the number  of ESALs  that a road  can
withstand  before it needs to be resurfaced  or rebuilt  is a power  function  of pavement  thickness.  For
example,  a pavement  that  is eleven  inches  thick  is about  twice  as durable  as one  that is nine inches  thick,
yet it costs  only  a fraction  more  to build.
These can be major issues from the view point of a private  operator,  since car volumes  dominate
carrying  capacity  metrics  and truck  characteristics  and volumes  are key to pavement  durability  aspects.
In essence,  cars  tend to be responsible  for how many lanes,  while trucks  are responsible  for how thick
each lane should  be. In economic  terms,  road  charges  should  have  two components:  one for pavement
damage,  based on ESALs,  and one for congestion,  based  on PCEs.  In practice,  though,  road pricing
tends  to use total  weight  rather  than axle loadings  for trucks,  and there  are only  beginning  to be some
attempts  at congestion  pricing  based  on PCEs  (Singapore,  Califomia  and  Britain)
*  Question 4: How  high  can  a toll  really  be?  There  is  a  limit  of  course.  A  users'
willingness to pay tolls  is a function  of income, the value they  assign to time  savings,
reductions  in  vehicle  operating  costs,  and  the  cost  and  quality  of  competing
alternatives.  On  average,  toll  rates  have  ranged  from  US$0.01  to  US$0.10  per
kilometer  per  car. Some congestion-related  tolls  in Europe  and  the United  States run
between  US$0.15  and US$0.20  per  kilometer  per  car, while  some bridge  and tunnel
tolls may range up to US$0.50  or more per kilometer.  There also are special situations
in which  toll  levels  are far  above these  averages  (the result  of high  costs  and  legal
requirements  for  inflation  adjustments).  In  Mexico,  tolls  have  risen  to  more  than
US$0.60  per kilometer in a couple of cases.  This experience  clearly shows that there  is
a ceiling to the willingness  to pay, since in these cases, traffic  volumes have tended to
be  quite  low  relative  to  capacity.  These  concessions  frequently  have  encountered
severe  financial  problems  and  congestion  on  alternative  roads  has  not  really  been
alleviated. Eventually,  regulators  have been forced to accept renegotiation.
*  Question  5: How  much freedom  should  the operator be allowed  to differentiate  its
toll structure?  As long as the operator stays within the allowed rate of return or overall
price  cap,  and as long  as there  is no  competition  (such as predatory  pricing  aimed  at
capturing  business  from a competing mode on a specific road), there  is no reason why
the regulator  should interfere with a tariff structure design aimed at making the most of
user  willingness  to  pay  or at  expanding  the  regular  customer  base.  There  are  many
40ways in which an operator can design its tariff structure to achieve these goals and
maximize profits:
o  Variation  by time of day is quite commonly allowed
o  Congestion  pricing is now becoming  increasingly  popular
o  High speed lanes: the idea of allowing the price of one lane to change with the
degree of congestion to service users in a rush allows the operator to make the most
of differences in the value of time of the various users.
o  Discounts for  loyal  customers: tolling  technology  is  now  allowing  the
recognition of a "frequent user" basis among commuters, and to promote the growth
of these clients, some companies are proposing special discounts to well-targeted
groups, including local residents or car pool commuters. In Argentina for instance,
the users of an electronic toll get a discount on some segments. Their prices vary
from US$0.80 and US$1.10, compared to the normal toll of US$1.40 to US$1.50.
5. QUALITY  REGULATION
The main quality issues that an economic regulator must be concerned with for the
performance of the concession are the technical quality of the road, compliance with the
contractual obligations, and safety and environmental  issues.
5.1 THE TECHNICAL  QUALITY OF  ROADS
Road quality issues need to  be considered at the outset of concession design and
technical  specification. Technical matters such as  pavement materials, thickness, and
construction techniques must be specified from the beginning since these aspects will help
determine the facility's performance and future maintenance and investment needs. An
inventory of the initial state of the assets is a minimum requirement for effective economic
regulation.  Asset  quality  indicators  include:  pavement  roughness  and  deterioration,
condition of lighting, markings, signaling, quality of fire and rescue equipment, condition
of  maintenance, and  weather-related equipment (e.g.,  snow  plows). The  monitoring,
inspection and certification  of the initial construction and investment is essential and should
include  all  related investments  such as  signage, pavement markings, toll  collection
facilities, fire and rescue services and access points. It also may extend to ancillary and
support facilities such as service stations  and restaurant plazas.
Once the toll road is in operation, quality aspects shift to making sure that the assets
are maintained, that performance standards are achieved, and that additional investments
are made when performance "triggers" are reached. Performance standards, which should
be established in the original concession  agreement, should include asset quality, operating
conditions, safety indicators, and emergency  readiness.
The regulatory authority should be prepared to audit records and inspect equipment on
a  regular basis. It  is also necessary to make sure that the concessionaire has reserved
sufficient funds for maintenance  and repair of the assets. This is particularly problematic in
the later years of the contract, where incentives to maintain equipment and facilities are
lower. Also,  if  any  of these  services are  provided by  subcontractors, the  regulatory
41authority should also be able to monitor the contract  terms and the financial  capability of all
of the parties to the contract.
In practice, what regulators generally do in an increasing number of countries is to
match that performance against the established parameters and quality standards set in the
World  Bank  Highway  Management Program.  This  is  effective  enough  to  identify
performance  outliers for most technical variables.
5.2. OPERATING  QUALITY OF ROAD  SERVICES
While maintenance of the assets is required for quality service, the regulator should not
forget that the  goal is to  provide transport services worth paying for. The operating
performance of the system is central to public support and to  determine at what point
additional  investment  may  be  required.  The  concession  contract  should  establish
performance  standards that cover
-Lane availability and shutdowns,
-Traffic volumes and average speeds, both peak and off-peak,
-Toll queue performance:  waiting times and availability,
-Capacity, speed and visibility during inclement  weather,
-Access conditions and bottlenecks,
-Activity levels at service plazas, and
-Response times and service aspects of emergency  vehicles.
The concessionaire  should be required to provide data on these performance aspects on
a regular basis (monthly or quarterly), subject to review and audit. If actual performance is
below the standard, the contract should specify the nature and type of sanctions to  be
imposed or the nature and timing of investments to be undertaken in response. This can be
quite tricky in practice. For example, not meeting a performance standard concerning the
length  and time  in  toll  queues could be  the result of  traffic  growth (requiring new
investment)  or poor maintenance  of collection equipment (requiring  improved performance
by  the  concessionaire). This  issue  is  particularly  important  when  new  investment
requirements  require revisions to the concession  contract.
5.3  SAFETY ASPECTS
Safety regulation takes a number of different forms. First, the facility itself must be
designed to handle the anticipated traffic volume and mix under a  variety of operating
conditions. These dimensions include such technical factors as capacity, speed, grades,
roughness, signaling, lighting and emergency services.
However, safety is not only a function of the physical characteristics of the road, but
also the quality and operation of the vehicles using the road. In particular, speeding, unsafe
driving practices, and poor vehicle inspection practices can lead to accidents. Most road
concessions, however, rely on existing police and motor vehicle registration/inspection
services provided by  the government, usually on  a  reimbursement basis. Here  again,
performance standards can help evaluate whether safety problems are the result of the
facility or from traffic enforcement shortcomings.  For example, if average speeds are above
the statutory limit, this may indicate reduced or ineffective enforcement.
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requirements. Since revenues from trucking activity are critical to toll road viability, how
trucking regulation is handled is  very important. In  some cases, truck inspection and
weighing stations are operated by concessionaires; in other cases, they are handled by
public  authorities  on  a  reimbursement basis.  Problems  have  arisen  where  stricter
enforcement of  weight regulations (overloading) has  led truckers to  avoid toll  roads.
However,  if  enforcement is  relaxed,  this  leads to  a  much  faster  rate  of  pavement
deterioration, and in many cases, higher accident frequency  and severity.
Overall, safety aspects of toll roads should be "built in" to  design and operating
standards. In practice, though, the nature of traffic and vehicle enforcement in the country
will shape accident rates and safety performance.  Because of this, countries should consider
toll road initiatives as providing an opportunity to improve public safety throughout the
road network.
5.4 ENVIRONMENTAL  ASPECTS
Environmental issues first  emerge in  contract design during  siting and  planning
decisions and must take into account geography, construction techniques and operating
practices of the facility. Initially, mitigation measures could include the adaptation of
designs with respect to alignments, materials used and standards for construction. During
construction, the concession should specify particular investments required to  improve
environmental  aspects, including  noise  barriers, retention  ponds  and  other  remedial
measures,  as  well  as  relocation and  resettlement issues, if  they  arise.  During  both
construction and operation, the regulatory authority should ensure that environmental laws
are complied with, including such aspects as use of salt and chemicals, runoff and recycling
of pavement materials. In practice, this aspect is often controlled by the environmental
agency rather than by the road authority, although there are obvious interactions between
the two institutions.
5.5. WORKING  WITH USER FEEDBACK
In addition to monitoring assets and performance, road concessions should have a
mechanism for public participation and feedback. This can be handled through a regular
system of surveys as well as the designation  of a user group that can provide information on
the qualitative aspects of the concession. Since toll roads tend to be highly visible, and in
many  cases  controversial, designing  mechanisms for  public  input  is  important  for
evaluating performance, to extend public knowledge of the project, and to  build public
support.
This  has  to  be  handled with  some  care however.  In  Brazil,  for  instance, each
concession is required to survey customer satisfaction every six months or so. Overall, user
satisfaction with the toll roads has been quite positive, although it is deteriorating. The
problem is that these results are biased because users have already demonstrated  their belief
in the value of the toll road by using it and continuing to use it increasingly, in spite of what
appears to be a worsening of the satisfaction.  Indeed, users who were extremely satisfied
with the immediate improvements in quality in the first year of road operation quickly
forgot about the initial conditions of the road and started to focus on their unhappiness at
having to pay for a (bad) road that used to be free. Improvements  are being noticed but they
are also being managed by improvements in customer service which have nothing to do
43with road services. Special events for children, presents for drivers and similar campaigns
just before the surveys can be quite effective in managing the emotions of the toll road
users at the right time.
6. PERFORMANCE  INDICATORS  AND  INFORMATION  REQUIREMENTS
We now have the new economics of private road concessions. We have learned about
the  extent  to  which  road  concessions are  vulnerable to  macroeconomic conditions,
exchange rate shocks and income growth. Demand has proven quite sensitive to toll levels,
income, GDP and trade activity. These sensitivities,  along with incentives to "buy in and
then get well" on the part of sponsors and creditors, have meant that many "private" toll
roads have required public financial support. The challenge is to design new structures  that
take into account the reality of public-private linkages and a more activist role for the
public sector in monitoring and regulating  concessions.
Regulators will not be able to  work on  such a  structure unless they have enough
information.  Once more, the contract  has a key role to play in this context. Road concession
contracts should contain an annex that specifies specific reporting requirements (including
clear definitions) for the concessionaire,  the frequency of the reporting requirements and
their format to facilitate comparisons  across projects. This information is required not only
to monitor contract  compliance,  but also to identify  when additional investments  are needed
and to help resolve disputes.
Too often, public authorities have placed great emphasis on technical specifications
and sponsor prequalification  in contract design, but pay less attention to making sure they
have good, timely information  about the performance of the concession and sponsor. But
even in  situations where technical and operating information is  consistently supplied,
governments have been faced with problems emerging from heavily leveraged projects or
from weak sponsor balance sheets. In principle,  non-recourse  project financing of toll roads
should place primary emphasis on the economics of the project itself. The need for more
equity capital in toll road projects means that profits from construction activities are not
enough, so that both project cash flows and sponsor financial condition must be stronger
than in the past. However, the 1990s have seen a large number of construction company
bankruptcies, so sound projects may be at risk because of weak sponsors.  This could occur
through a lack of investments  being made due to a shortage  of funds, due to losses on other
projects reducing the sponsor's equity capital, or due to financial risks from exchange rate
or refinancing  risks.
Thus, regulatory authorities need a  range of  technical, operational and  financial
information not only about the project, but about the project participants themselves. This
information is not intended to be used to micro-manage  the concession, but rather to serve
as an  "early-warning system " to reduce the likelihood and costs of restructuring and
bailout. Such information  should include the data in Table 1.6.
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Lane  availability
Average  speed by time of day
'roll station  availability
Toll  station queueing  time by time of day
Accident  and safety indicators
Availability  of emergency  equipment
Engineering  quality indicators  (roughness,  signage,  lighting)
Traffic  volume by vehicle class
Traffic volume  by time of day (peak/off-peak)
Revenue collected  by vehicle class
Revenue  collected by time of day (peak/off-peak)
Revenue  generated by ancillary services
Revenue from enforcement  levies
Revenue and volumes  from different discount  programs  (commuter,  high frequency)





Cost of special services  for particular  users (e.g., truck  weigh stations)
Investment  spending  vs. budget (including  variance  analysis)
Physical  investment  (e.g., lane km resurfaced)











Maintenance  and renewal program
0poso  fpia  1nfo  ii*'
Income statement,  balance  sheet and cash flow statements  (audited)
Working capital
Debt service schedule  and currency  structures
The Project Operational  Indicators are intended to monitor the physical aspects of the
project, from pavement and equipment conditions to performance in terms of  facility
availability, safety  and technical efficiency. The Revenue Indicators are  intended to
45monitor the performance  of the contract,  and are especially  important when the government
is providing  revenue or traffic guarantees.  Reporting  of revenues  across time periods and by
user groups is needed to understand the structure of demand and to monitor efforts by
sponsors to raise revenues through discounting, etc. Revenues from ancillary services are
needed to understand the basis for rate of return or price cap regulation and to understand
the interaction between direct toll and ancillary revenues.  Cost data is needed to make sure
services are being provided at the lowest cost, and to  monitor costs to be  included in
regulatory calculations.
Since many road concessions are designed to bring new investment, information is
needed about ongoing investment activity compared to contract requirement and budget
plans. This investment information should be compared with traffic volumes to validate
prior forecasts  and to determine  whether these programs should be delayed or accelerated.
Project  financial indicators are  intended to  monitor the  liquidity, solvency and
profitability of the concession.  These indicators are similar to those contained  in covenants
imposed  by creditors and are needed for rate of return or price cap regulation.
The importance of detailed information about the quality and value of assets has
tended to be under-appreciated  by regulators. First, the quality of assets is central to the
performance of the road. Second, the long-lived nature of road infrastructure means it is
relatively easy to defer maintenance in the short-run to boost returns, allowing road and
equipment to deteriorate and accelerate major overhaul requirements. Third, the treatment
of asset depreciation and amortization is very important in determining the "base" form
which rates of return are computed. In general, tax policies typically allow the write off of
road infrastructure  on an accelerated  basis or with a shorter tax life than economic  life. This
disparity means that after the facility is depreciated for tax purposes, there is reduced
incentive to maintain the asset. Moreover, if regulatory accounting for the concession uses
a longer amortization period than tax accounting,  the higher regulatory net asset values at
any point in time will lead to higher tolls to provide a specified  rate of return on assets. The
sponsor thus receives higher returns in the early years from tax depreciation, then higher
returns from the regulatory accounting  that includes asset valuations that already have been
written off for tax purposes. There is  a need either to  harmonize regulatory and tax
treatment of assets, or to make sure that regulatory rate of return calculations take into
account tax benefits from accelerated  depreciation.
Finally, there is a need for ongoing financial reporting by the sponsors themselves,
beyond the  specific project. Sponsors should be  required to  provide audited financial
statements  to make sure that the prequalification  status is maintained throughout  the life of
the concession. Standard financial statements should be supplemented  by debt servicing
schedules and working capital positions. This data will help make sure the specific project
is not put at risk by financial troubles of the parent, a "twist" on the traditional concerns of
non-recourse  financing.
We know a lot more about the challenges involved in getting highways and urban
access roads tolled than we did at the beginning  of the 1990s.  All players know much more
about it: the sponsors are more prepared to face risks that they understand better; the
construction  companies are probably even more anxious to get involved; and the users have
also learned about how to fight for their rights more effectively. Regulators also know
46much more, but their knowledge is more an appreciation of how little they have known
about the  business of  the  monitoring toll  road  packages prepared by  consultants or
privatization teams. Regulators have also learned that they will often been firefighters and
that the only way to be effective in that role is to better prepare for the job while they can.
Too few toll road  regulators have been successful in improving their preparation, but
hopefully with a little help from this chapter, they will be asking more and better question
from the teams that are preparing toll road packages, and they will be able to argue more
effectively  with  concessionaires who  are  trying  to  renegotiate commitments  to  the
government.
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